BOOK REVIEW ROUNDTABLE

Kenneth B. Pyle’s
Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose
ISBN: 1-5864-8417-6 (cloth)

Richard J. Samuels’
Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia
ISBN: 0-8014-4612-0 (cloth)

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Mike M. Mochizuki
Ming Wan
Christopher W. Hughes
Richard J. Samuels
Kenneth B. Pyle
In the late 1980s, when Japan’s economic boom hit its high point of “irrational exuberance,” the West seemed able to find plausible any tale concocted by any charlatan who had spent two weeks in Japan. For a gluttonous and gullible West, alleged links between samurai swordsmanship and just-in-time management seemed no less improbable than analysis of jujitsu as a guarantee that the “land of the rising sun” would dominate the 21st century. The popping of Japan’s economic bubble soon displaced that of triumphalist champagne corks. Global insouciance ushered in a wave of “Japan passing” that was combined with a love-hate fascination with a rapidly growing China that might be a new source of economic dynamism—or a perfidious military threat.

These two books, each by a foremost authority on Japan, mark a new swing of the pendulum. Gone, each argues, is the Japan of the Yoshida Doctrine premised as it was on high economic growth and passivity in global affairs. “Checkbook diplomacy” and “free rides” on defense have been replaced by a Japanese foreign policy that is conspicuously more robust, more military-focused, and more nationalistic.

Neither Kenneth Pyle nor Richard Samuels gives credibility to those who dismiss Japan and its foreign policies as irrational, passive, or lacking in strategic thought. Instead, these two authors present rich and compatible, though unique, portraits of Japanese strategic history, demonstrating the overarching rationality behind Japan’s shifting policies. Pyle, as the historian, devotes roughly two-thirds of his analysis to Japan’s policies during the Meiji period, the liberal 1920s, World War II, and the early postwar period, showing how Japanese elites adapted to changing external environments in the pragmatic pursuit of national wealth and power. Today, he argues, Japan is in the midst of yet the latest adaptation, this time to the new post–Cold War environment, where, particularly in East Asia, the challenges from a nuclear North Korea and a “rising China” provide the stimulus behind a resurgent Japan.

Samuels’ sensitivity to historical roots plays out in his analysis of ongoing coalitional dances among domestic political competitors whom
he sees as the key shapers of Japanese foreign policy. Samuels shows how new ideological configurations are today combining to produce what I have elsewhere called the “regime shift” that underpins Japan’s new grand strategy. ¹ While Pyle italicizes the underlying rationality of eventual Japanese security choices, Samuels teases out precisely how competing Japanese elites put forward alternatives that can offer equal, though dramatically different, claims to rationality. What shapes Japan’s choices, Samuels contends, are changing norms and identities and their power in the country’s ongoing policy discourse. In his words, “collectively held understandings of social life and national aspiration are not bequeathed by history but [are] forged and reforged in the crucible of political debate” (p. 187). As a consequence, Samuels places emphasis on how political entrepreneurs are now using these understandings to sell their own preferences for a post-Yoshida “Goldilocks consensus” that gets things “just right.”

To even the most jaded Japan watcher, each book offers page after page of insightful nuggets on specific facets of Japanese power and strategy, including the enhanced influence of a new generation of Japanese politicians born after World War II.

A major focus in both books is the U.S.-Japan relationship. There Pyle is more sanguine than Samuels. Pyle sees the alliance—albeit in a more symmetrical reconfiguration than at present—as the pillar for a stable Asian region and the pivot for a trilateral relationship among Japan, China, and the United States. Samuels, in contrast, underscores the open debate about the alliance now going on in Japan, noting that there are those who see the United States as posing “as great a threat to Japan as any hostile neighbor” (p. 151). Moreover, though neither says it so bluntly, as Japan shifts the balance away from what Samuels calls its “mercantile sword” to a greater reliance on its “military shield,” the U.S.-Japan alliance risks losing its credibility as a guarantor to Asians against a substantially larger military role for Japan (p. 8).

The debate in Japan over the country’s strategic future is matched by an equal uncertainty in the United States about the ongoing transformation taking place in Asian geopolitics. The region as a whole has become increasingly interconnected economically and even institutionally. Moreover, the Japanese—and subsequently the Asian—economic miracle offers unmistakable evidence that national power is no longer the exclusive

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province of the country with the stronger military force. Asia’s combination of regionalism and economic power suggests that future strategies by both Japan and the United States must move beyond bilateral relationships and military muscle flexing. Yet at present both countries are resisting these new realities in their tightened embrace of one another.

China has become a master at utilizing soft power, economic openness, and diplomacy to win friends across the region and more broadly. In sharp contrast, Japanese and U.S. actions have been driving other countries in the region away. In Japan’s case, the most obvious deterrents are the full-throated denial by many conservatives of the dark side of Japan’s military expansion, the movement away from the strategic uses of economics as a tool of positive engagement with China or North Korea, the embrace of ballistic missile defense, and the continued domestic protectionism that Pyle correctly identifies as a continuation of historical efforts “to preempt the establishment of any kind of foreign foothold in the Japanese domestic economy” (p. 56).

Meanwhile, the dismal failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts to catalyze regime change in the “axis of evil” has led, among other things, to North Korea’s joining China, Russia, and the United States as Northeast Asia’s fourth nuclear power, a fractious rift between the United States and South Korea, and the rapid erosion of U.S. prestige in every country in East Asia except Japan. Furthermore, U.S. China policy has flip-flopped as the administration has sought to accommodate competing demands from a business community keen to embrace China as the source of cheaper goods and larger markets, a White House that must enlist China’s help to keep the six-party talks alive, and a Department of Defense anxious to prevent China from challenging U.S. hegemony in Asia—despite the fact that, as Pyle points out, China “cannot be a realistic military competitor of the United States for decades” (p. 347). More broadly, the United States is losing friends in Asia and elsewhere because, as Samuels argues: “It is clear that American universalism today, as in 1918, would be more attractive were it not so transparently self-serving” (p. 186).

The debate concerning how Japan will influence Asia’s security future is well underway. Each of these books contributes mightily to our understanding of this unfolding drama. Although present trends are of concern in both books, no matter how the pendulum may swing, the richness of their analyses will ensure that each book is well-thumbed and enjoys a long shelf-life.
Change in Japan’s Grand Strategy: Why and How Much?

Mike M. Mochizuki

The authors of these excellent books on Japanese grand strategy traverse beyond their home disciplines. The historian Kenneth B. Pyle explains shifts in Japan by applying a political science theory that argues that the international system shapes a country’s domestic institutions as well as its external behavior. The political scientist Richard J. Samuels places the current Japanese debates about strategy in a broad historical context to “connect the ideological dots” of national discourse over nearly 150 years of history. Both books seek to assess the degree and nature of change in Japanese strategy, to explain this change, and to suggest where Japan might be headed. Although there is much about which Pyle and Samuels agree, there are also some significant differences.

Both Pyle and Samuels embrace the virtually unanimous consensus among Japan scholars that Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru established the basic parameters of Japan’s post–World War II foreign policy during the peace negotiations with the United States. The two authors show how during the 1950s and 1960s Yoshida’s shrewd diplomatic tactics were transformed into a grand strategy. This transformation was achieved by grounding “mercantile realism”\(^1\) (Pyle, pp. 212, 256–62) in robust domestic institutions, by adopting explicit brakes on Japan’s defense policies (what Samuels calls “baking the pacifist loaf” in chapter 2) so as to resist U.S. pressures on Japan to make greater military contributions to the alliance, and by forging a new national consensus. Although much of this ground has been covered by other writings, these two books provide a clear and readable account of the emergence and impact of this so-called Yoshida Doctrine.\(^2\) It is in their respective analyses of

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\(^1\) The concept of “mercantile realism” was developed in Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 171–203.

how Japan appears to be moving away from this grand strategy, however, that Pyle and Samuels make their mark.

In Pyle’s view, the end of the Cold War brought about the unraveling of the Yoshida Doctrine—both in economic and military dimensions. Economically, the end of autarkic communist regimes fueled economic globalization that in turn exposed the structural weaknesses of the Japanese economy and the need for Japan to move beyond catch-up developmental capitalism. Militarily, the collapse of the Soviet Union yielded a more uncertain and fluid security environment in which Japan’s “cheap ride” on the U.S. security guarantee became less viable—even though Japan continued to host U.S. military bases and forces. The first post–Cold War international crisis, the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, revealed the diplomatic risks and reputational costs of Japan’s pacifism. The North Korean nuclear crisis, which emerged because of the post–Cold War reconfiguration of major power alignments, confirmed that Japan not only depended on the United States for its own defense, but also could ill afford to be a passive security bystander. Therefore, rather than resisting U.S. expectations that Japan do more for regional and global security (as Japan had done under Yoshida and his followers), Japan began to embrace greater bilateral defense cooperation and to participate in overseas peacekeeping missions. Both Japan’s post–September 11 naval refueling support for military operations against Afghanistan and Iraq and its ground force deployments for postwar reconstruction in Iraq reflect this trend.

To nail down his argument about the primacy of international structure, Pyle stresses the failure of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s agenda. In Pyle’s view, Nakasone was the sole Japanese prime minister of the Cold War era who wanted to break out from the Yoshida Doctrine. Nakasone ultimately failed to achieve his objective because of “fierce resistance from the bureaucracy and the mainstream conservatives” (p. 276). More importantly, the domestic motivation for change was absent because the persistence of “the Cold War international structure” made it “difficult to change a foreign policy and an institutional structure that had been so successful in exploiting that order” (p. 276). Therefore, as Pyle sees it, the demise of this Cold War international structure provides both the motivation and the opportunity to develop and pursue a new grand strategy.

In explaining Japan’s changing strategy, Samuels refrains from emphasizing international structure above other factors. He argues that change in Japan’s security policy is “overdetermined” by multiple catalysts: international events, domestic political struggles, societal change, institutional
change, and the transformation of the U.S. defense establishment and policy (p. 64). In identifying “sociological, ideological, and institutional” changes in the Japanese defense establishment as causal factors, Samuels diverges from Pyle’s “outside-in” argument. Samuels states that “none [of these changes] is the direct result of shifts in global or regional balances of power, and each is related to domestic political competition” (p. 71). By giving less relative weight to international structure as a driver of Japanese change, unlike Pyle he does not stress a sharp discontinuity starting from the end of the Cold War. Therefore, rather than treating the Nakasone era as a failed attempt at strategic change, Samuels sees the 1980s as the beginning of the “strategic slicing” of the “pacifist loaf” that was baked earlier and views the aftermath of the Cold War and the 1991 Persian Gulf War as simply an acceleration of this slicing—“slicing in earnest.”

Compared to Pyle, Samuels’ view of domestic dynamics being just as critical as shifts in the international environment offers a clearer picture of the strategic debate in Japan today. In explicating four general schools of thought (neo-autonomists, pacifists, normal nationalists, and middle-power internationalists), Samuels notes that each of these options has its roots in earlier periods of intense strategic debate that extend back into the nineteenth century. Moreover, Samuels sketches out the possibility of a new consensus emerging from this latest round of debate through a process of “blurring.” “Blurring” across strategic divides takes places because “domestic politics and foreign threats intervene to complicate choices” and Japanese politicians will logroll, compromise, and even shift sides (p. 131). Samuels then speculates that the new strategic consensus will be a moderate one that “resemble[s] Goldilocks’ preferences: Japan’s relationships with the United States and China will be neither too hot nor too cold, and its posture in the region will be neither too big nor too small” (p. 131–32).

All of this raises the question of how great a strategic shift Japan is likely to make. Looking at the way in which Pyle has set up his book, he seems to believe that Japan’s shift will be major. Early on he presents the Japanese puzzle of “abrupt changes and wide swings of international behavior” (p. 19). In his review of history, Pyle delineates four fundamental changes both in the international order that triggered sweeping changes in Japan’s domestic order and in its national strategy. Pyle’s addition of the end of the Cold War bipolar system in 1989 as the fifth in this list of international order changes suggests that Japan is about to make a strategic shift comparable to what took place in 1868, 1921–22, 1931, or 1945. Indeed Pyle ends the book by declaring that the Yoshida Doctrine is “a dead letter” and that “the changes that Japan is making
are not peripheral adjustments; rather they point toward a comprehensive revision of the Japanese system” (p. 374).

Pyle, however, peppers his work with numerous caveats, thereby muddying his picture of Japan’s strategic direction. For example, he writes, “The Japanese want to formulate a new, self-generated strategic vision, gain self-mastery and autonomy, and shape a new self-image, but there is little sign that such goals will readily emerge from domestic sources alone” (p. 353). Although Pyle fancies the Heisei generation to be the human agents of strategic change, he adds that “Heisei leaders have yet to define clear new national goals or a sense of national purpose that might someday form the basis of a new national consensus.” They are not even able to agree on how to change the constitution (p. 361). These qualifications ultimately emerge because of Pyle’s “outside-in” argument. The Cold War may have ended in 1989, but the structural change for East Asia is much less clear-cut than it has been for Europe. The Soviet Union may have collapsed, but the Cold War conflicts of the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan straits persist. Both the preeminence of U.S. military and economic power in the Asia-Pacific and the U.S. alliance system that existed during the Cold War period continue into the post–Cold War period—even with the rise of China.

Although there may have been important changes in Japan’s international environment, those changes have not been so fundamental as to point clearly to a new strategy. Therefore while having made incremental adjustments to external change, Japan has not made an abrupt shift comparable to the pursuit of economic and military modernization after the Meiji Restoration, the seizure of Manchuria and continental expansion after the collapse of Wilsonian international liberalism, or the Yoshida Doctrine that combined security pacifism and mercantile realism after the end of World War II and during the Cold War.

Despite all of the talk of a more proactive and assertive Japan with (what Pyle calls) a resurgence of power and purpose, Japan appears to remain essentially a reactive or adaptive state. Tokyo is recalibrating its existing foreign policy in response to external changes and pressures and is adopting a “wait-and-see” approach regarding the “unfolding international system” (especially regarding the rise of China and the future of U.S.-China relations). Japan is not, however, energetically wielding its power and influence to shape the international order. For example, whereas Japan may be assertive on the issue of North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens, Tokyo’s singular focus on this issue has ironically hampered its ability to influence the dynamics of the six-party talks regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. Given Tokyo’s
keen energy interests and its “normal” diplomatic relations with Tehran, its international passivity regarding the Iranian nuclear problem is stunning.

Samuels uses a different conceptual language to examine where Japan might be going. Rather than focusing on “international structure,” he concentrates on “threats” (chapter 6). In his view, Japan sees myriad threats—coming from rising China, North Korea, challenges to Japan’s technological and industrial base, and even its ally the United States (because of the possibility of entrapment, abandonment, and divergent interests and priorities). A national strategic culture that emphasizes vulnerability, prestige, and autonomy will shape how Japan responds to these threats. Institutional inertia, democratic competition, pragmatism, and calculations about U.S. power and regional power balances, however, will check “a straight path toward Japanese muscularity” (p. 198). In the final analysis, Samuels believes that Japan will opt for a “dual hedge” strategy that involves on the one hand relying on the United States to counter China’s military power and other regional security threats and on the other hand seizing the commercial opportunities presented by China’s rise and resisting U.S. economic predation (pp. 200–01). In short, Japan will seek to have it both ways.

Does this constitute a new strategy or just a more robust and updated version of the Yoshida Doctrine? I believe it is the latter. As Prime Minister Abe Shinzo wishes, Japan may reinterpret the constitution to allow it to shoot down missiles headed for the United States, help defend U.S. warships operating near Japan or near Japanese maritime self-defense vessels when they come under attack, or protect nearby foreign peacekeepers during Japanese involvement in U.N.-sanctioned peacekeeping operations abroad. As significant as these steps may be, however, they fall short of allowing Japan to become a great military power. Even while relaxing the constitutional barriers on defense policy, Japan is likely to maintain strong constraints on the use of military force in operations that do not relate directly to the defense of its own territory. The other key elements of the Yoshida Doctrine (e.g., the alliance with the United States, the hosting of U.S. military bases and forces, and economic realism) are also likely to remain intact.

Samuels’ metaphor of a Goldilocks strategy, however, may work only under the current international situation in which the U.S. regional alliance system remains robust, the United States is willing to counter actual and potential threats from North Korea and China, and the power balance relative to a rising China continues to favor the United States. If the U.S. alliance system is hollowed out, the United States disengages from East Asia, or China begins to eclipse the United States in power and influence,
however, then the international structure in Asia would have changed so fundamentally that the strategic break with the past that Pyle posits Japan making might finally occur. One wonders if under such conditions Samuels’ Goldilocks dynamic would still operate enabling Japan to forge a new strategic consensus that gets it “just right” rather than pursue a pathological course as the country did during the 1930s. Put differently, Pyle may not be wrong about the possibility of an abrupt strategic shift; he may just be premature. If the era of U.S. preeminence and engagement in the Asia-Pacific were to come to an end, however, Pyle’s book does not provide much guidance for what the substance of Japan’s new strategy is likely to be—except to say that it will be different from the Yoshida Doctrine.

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Japan’s Rise and Its Alliance with the United States

Ming Wan

Japan is rising. The timely books written by Pyle and Samuels each shed light on this important development in world politics, a momentous change that has been overshadowed by China’s rise. One needs to be selective when reviewing two rich and nuanced books under any circumstances; fortunately, as part of a panel, this review can afford to be even more selective in coverage.

U.S. analysis of Japanese foreign policy often reflects a sense of tension between a long-held desire for Japan to play a larger security role within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, on the one hand, and unease concerning a lack of clear understanding of Japan’s intentions, on the other hand. At the beginning of his book Pyle makes the statement, “Drawing Japan into a more active role in its global strategy is a major objective of U.S. policy,” immediately followed by the observation that “Despite more than a century of alliance experience, American understanding of Japanese character, motivation, and purpose remains shaky” (p. 3). Is the United States flying blind then?

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Pyle’s and Samuels’ books go a long way toward helping us decipher Japanese purpose and strategy. Pyle provides a sweeping review of Japanese foreign policy behavior. He begins with a succinct discussion of Japan operating mostly independently in the Chinese world order of the premodern period. Japan sought to centralize its domestic institutions by following the model of the Chinese system during the seventh and eighth centuries more because of a sense of threat from China and Korea than out of awe for Chinese civilization (pp. 34–36). A historian by training, Pyle deftly discusses the forces of history and patterns of Japanese behavior over time. He emphasizes six such patterns of behavior in Japanese foreign policy: attentiveness to power, lack of universal ideals, adaptation and accommodation, autonomy and regional hegemony, emulation, and status seeking (pp. 42–65). Pyle detects a particular theme running through Japanese foreign policy, namely the dominant role played by Japan’s conservative elite class who for the past 150 years “was rarely satisfied with the distribution of world power.” Driven by their distrust of other nations, this elite “has consistently manifested an impulse to maximize Japan’s share of world power” (p. 44).

One may infer from Pyle’s analysis that Japan is unlikely to make a sudden move hostile to the international system so long as U.S. efforts to ensure the stability of the international order do not hurt Japanese interests. After all, Japan has chosen to side with the strong—which is now the United States (p. 44). Pyle cautions, however, that Japan’s rise has major implications for the alliance, which will not evolve into one similar to that between the United States and Great Britain because Japan “is motivated by different imperatives, values, traditions, and practices” (p. 368). Put simply, Japan has its own agenda and does not wish to be hostage to U.S. security policy.

In analyzing Japan’s grand strategy the Samuels book, by contrast, presents a shorter historical narrative that extends back only as far as the Meiji period. Taking issue with Pyle’s book for placing a bit too much emphasis on Japan’s ability to adapt to shifting international orders (p. 4), Samuels argues that Japanese views are “not bequeathed by history but forged and reforged in the crucible of political debate” (p. 187). A political scientist, Samuels takes the view that Japan is no less “normal” than any other state (p. 7) and therefore can be understood as readily as any other state. Throughout the book Samuels reinforces the view that Japan’s decisions over the past century have been normal from a strategic perspective. Focusing on strategic culture, strategic constraints, and strategic opportunities, Samuels argues that Japan has formulated a coherent national security strategy on three occasions: a “rich nation and strong army” strategy in the second
half of the nineteenth century, a strategy to create a Japan-led imperialist order in Asia in the early twentieth century, and a trading-nation strategy following World War II. Samuels sees Japan as currently in the process of again creating such a strategic consensus (p. 6).

Unlike some strategists in Washington, D.C., who want to see a closer alliance with a more assertive Japan as a check on a rising China, Samuels views Japan’s rise as complicating the alliance. Similar to Pyle, Samuels sees Japan pursuing twin objectives of autonomy and prestige, hedging against future risks through self-insurance. Thus, Japan will choose not to be too close to China or too distant from the United States. Samuels also posits that the United States may see the formal alliance as less cost-effective and choose a less obligatory security structure in East Asia (pp. 205–09).

In short, Japan’s rise constitutes a new challenge to Tokyo’s alliance with Washington. Judging by its longevity, the U.S.-Japan alliance is an acknowledged success. It is in the interest of both sides not only to maintain the alliance—given the past investment—but also to reinvent the alliance, even after the original threat that gave rise to the alliance has disappeared. To successfully accommodate a rising Japan, the two sides could restructure the alliance as a more equal arrangement. Past successes do not guarantee future ones, however, particularly in current circumstances when Japan is changing. As Pyle recognizes, the United States has been surprised by Japan time and time again (p. 3).

Given that such a close and formalized relationship allows access to information, one way to manage uncertainties is to maintain the alliance. In fact, regardless of whether the Japanese elite are articulate about their strategic vision, the strategic discourse in Japan is arguably more transparent than in other regional powers (Samuels, p. 5). Following the same logic, however, the United States has a strong incentive to reach out to China and other states to manage uncertainties and risks as well. More important, unless the United States sees a conflict with China as inevitable, Washington has little incentive to be involved in disputes Japan has with its own neighbors that could easily draw the United States into a conflict not of its own making. Thus, just as Japan is hedging in a fast-changing environment, the United States may also hedge against the greater costs of a closer alliance with Japan by forging closer relations with the rest of East Asia, a strategy that would in turn add complexity to its relations with Japan.
Japan’s Doctoring of the Yoshida Doctrine

Christopher W. Hughes

Commenting on these two excellent books written by two of the most internationally influential scholars working on Japan’s foreign and security policies is a daunting task. Boasting breadth and depth of coverage, these thought-provoking and timely analyses hold significant implications for a variety of questions related to the future of Japan, U.S. regional and global strategy, and indeed the future of East Asian regionalism.

Kenneth Pyle’s and Richard Samuels’ substantial volumes converge a great deal in their objectives and approaches; both trace the path of Japan’s security policy historically and into the contemporary period. The two works do, however, diverge somewhat in their overall conclusions on Japan’s current and most likely future direction. Both Pyle and Samuels argue that Tokyo’s security policy in the modern era is best understood within the context of Japan’s determination to maintain national autonomy in an often disadvantageous international system. These two scholars both hold that since the Meiji period Japan’s elite policymakers have eventually settled on a series of policy consensuses in an attempt to navigate through international challenges. Although acknowledging that Japan previously made catastrophic mistakes in its security policy (most notably the Pacific War), Pyle and Samuels argue that on the whole Japanese elites maneuver extraordinarily well in generating policy options that have broadly preserved Japanese autonomy. In particular, these two experts offer superb analyses not only of Japan’s post-war policy consensus in the form of the “Yoshida Doctrine” but also of how, by staying close to the U.S. hegemon, Tokyo has managed to achieve many national goals that in former periods Japan had not been able to achieve.

I see the key divergences between Pyle and Samuels, however, centering on the debate as to whether since the late 1980s Japan has made a transition away from the Yoshida Doctrine. Samuels argues persuasively that Japan, has not seriously considered abandoning the Yoshida Doctrine, despite public rhetoric implying that Japan might either acquiesce to U.S. domination or bid for outright autonomy. In fact, Samuels contends that as Japan since the late 1990s has strengthened ties with the United States, Tokyo has used the various military and diplomatic changes engendered by this shift to expand the range

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of hedging options. Japan has thus avoided the specter of entrapment by creating new avenues for hedging, thereby perpetuating the essence of the Yoshida Doctrine. He offers the scenario of a revamped Yoshida Doctrine, or new Goldilocks consensus, (p. 209) under which Tokyo is retaining close ties to the United States in order to exploit the benefits of hegemonic protection and yet is purposefully limiting the risk of hitching Japan irreversibly to U.S. military adventurism. Although less unequivocal than Samuels, Pyle intimates that Japan’s constant sensitivity to the changing international system, especially with regard to perceptions of declining U.S. hegemony and growing challenges from China, suggests that Tokyo may be poised to abandon the Yoshida Doctrine consensus.

Whether the Yoshida Doctrine is dying and what might come next are questions on which Pyle and Samuels diverge in their analysis; this is where my own reading of the Japanese situation differs as well. I do not disagree with Pyle and Samuels’ understanding of the general trajectory of Japan’s security policy to date, the predilection of Japanese elite to maximize autonomy, and the great skill and ingenuity with which these leaders have sought to maintain hedging options. As I have argued elsewhere, however, I doubt the staying-power of Japanese elites’ determination to hedge and the skill with which they have played their hand in keeping their options open to both counter over-dependence on the U.S.-Japan alliance and the risks of entrapment. ¹

I agree with the final two chapters of Pyle’s volume: there is a new restlessness among Japanese policy elites, who are now desiring to assert a stronger international identity. The United States is pushing Japan to do more as an ally for regional and global security; Tokyo is sure to react by demanding that Washington provide greater consultation, reciprocity, and respect as a security partner. Moreover, the domestic policymaking system in Japan is changing, with prime ministerial leadership increasingly dependent on the vagaries of public opinion. Matching in part Pyle’s analysis, I would argue that this change provides political elites greater incentives to pursue a more assertive foreign policy against North Korea and China. In turn, this enhanced nationalist orientation in Japanese security policy may pose new risks for Washington, as the United States finds itself tied to a more erratic and perhaps aggressive alliance partner. The rise of regionally destabilizing spats with China in particular risk that would be heightened.

At the same time, however, I am doubtful that the more assertive political leadership in Japan necessarily reflects a serious desire to move away from the U.S. ambit in security. True, the mainstream policy elite in Japan is currently dominated by revisionists who often see the U.S.-Japan relationship as one of expediency. The revisionist view is that the relationship can be cunningly manipulated to Japan’s advantage and perhaps downgraded or even discarded when no longer serving national objectives. Still, this elite adheres very strongly to U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. Japan’s reaction both to the threats from North Korea and China and to September 11 certainly do not provide support for Japan’s unconditional provision of alliance support to the United States; the Japanese response does, however, demonstrate Japan’s (probably forlorn) hope to “equalize” the U.S.-Japan alliance and work more closely with the United States. Japanese momentum in security policy is toward strengthening ties with the United States; there is very little serious mainstream policy effort directed toward conceiving genuine substitutes, such as autonomy or multilateralism. Indeed, I wonder how much motivation and imagination Japanese policy elites have to break out of the Yoshida Doctrine and find a real alternative. Many of the rising generation of political, bureaucratic, and military elite have been socialized into viewing the alliance as Japan’s natural state of affairs and thus see little alternative to “partnership” with the United States. The Japanese public is, moreover, not buying into U.S. military adventurism and is dissatisfied with many of the new alliance undertakings in the recent Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) on base realignments. At the same time, however, Japanese citizens are not protesting in the streets against the alliance as in 1960 and 1970, or at least do not yet fully perceive the risks of emerging alliance cooperation. This thus renders public opinion to be mostly an obstacle that has to be carefully circumvented or manipulated by policymakers, but is rarely a total roadblock on alliance cooperation.

Hence, from top to bottom Japanese society perceives few alternatives to the alliance relationship. I appreciate the intellectual intent of the security discourse and acknowledge that Japan is capable of surprising the rest of the world, thereby necessitating careful analysis. Much of the discourse regarding various options to the alliance displays elements of izakaya nationalist sentiment. That is to say that this discourse—playing on the popular resentment of Japan’s perceived position under the thumb of the United States—is the type that one might find in smoke-filled taverns across Japan after a few drinks; this discourse, however, dissipates when exposed to the realities of the cold atmosphere beyond the protection of the tavern. Indeed, if I were forced to wear a hyper-realist hat, I might argue that it is
only the security blanket of the U.S.-Japan alliance that allows Japan to debate these various options. If there was any real danger of losing the U.S. security guarantee, Japan would quickly abandon this debate and move even closer to the United States. This does not belittle the internal debate in Japan; both the debate and the revisionists (such as Abe) require attention, as they pose some unpredictable challenges, and I do not doubt their own increasingly ideologically charged intent regarding their agenda on questions of historical revisionism and great power aspirations. I am skeptical, however, that Japan would have the appetite to break away from the United States after engaging in any sober strategic cost-benefit analysis of the value of the alliance against alternatives. My perspective is, therefore, closer to Samuels’ conclusion that Japan is likely to “hug the U.S. closer”—even if I arrive at the conclusion from a slightly different approach.

Even if I agreed with Samuels that Japan is likely to remain close to the United States for time being, I have serious doubts to Tokyo’s ability to distance itself from Washington even if it so desired. While I agree with Samuels’ brilliant characterization that Japan is attempting a “dual hedge” strategy, I do not share the confidence that Tokyo can implement this to avoid the risks of entrapment. Samuels outlines areas where he sees Japan reassessing and upgrading its hedging options, with Tokyo having achieved some significant successes at least in a few cases so far.

Samuels points out Japan’s plans to maintain leading edge technologies while at the same time denying such technologies to competitors such as China; yet most of his analysis does not go beyond the level of reporting the plans, and thus it is difficult to judge the validity of his predictions. Similarly, I am less sanguine about the prospects for Japan’s defense industry to emerge from the current perceived crisis. Surely, there are plenty of Keidanren and Japanese government reports and initiatives, and Japan may achieve much by using key defense technologies to leverage greater degree of autonomy. Yet Japan’s defense export ban—with the exception of limited projects for cooperation with the United States—remains stubbornly in place and probably will remain so as long as the LDP’s ties its electoral fortunes to the coalition with the Komeito. In the meantime, Japan’s defense contractors remain under severe pressure and still play only a subcontracting role to the United States on many of the really high-tech weapons systems such as ballistic missile defense (BMD).

I also doubt the likelihood that Tokyo can carve out its own regional hedging option. Having recaptured some of the ground lost to China with its rather desperate free trade agreement (FTA) policy, Japan still faces fierce
competition both from China and from a predatory U.S. FTA policy. Japan could successfully block China’s influence in ASEAN by employing bilateral FTAs and by diluting the ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summit processes. Stalemating China in such a way, however, simply closes off the regional option as an alternative diplomatic and security space, forcing Japan back into the U.S.-Japan alliance. Abe may attempt to construct a regional counter-coalition to China by drawing in Australia and India, yet neither will allow themselves to be used as a strong counterbalance to China. As for bilateral relations with China, I agree that Japan will strive toward strong economic ties, while hedging militarily against Beijing. The security dilemma facing the two states is unlikely to disappear, however, blocking the option for Japan to use China as an effective counterweight against the United States.

As for North Korea, I could not agree more with Samuels’ analysis that Tokyo has used the North Korean threat as a pretext to further develop Japan’s military capability. Some of these newly acquired capabilities hint at more autonomy, such as strike capabilities against North Korean missile bases; most of these capabilities, however, are part and parcel of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation, such as the revised Defense Guidelines, emergency legislation, and BMD. The abductions of Japanese citizens have caused headaches for the alliance, upset the six-party talks process and generally led Tokyo to pursue somewhat of an independent diplomatic track toward Pyongyang. Ultimately, though, Japan is likely to grudgingly toe the U.S. line on North Korea. Certainly, Japanese mention of using the nuclear option to deter North Korea is useful sabre-rattling, grabbing North Korean and Chinese attention and nudging the United States to focus on the North Korean issue. Japanese policymakers are clearly aware, however, that an actual nuclear exercise would ultimately be more destabilizing for Japan’s national security.

If Japan is finding hedging against the alliance to be increasingly difficult, I am also doubtful how well Tokyo is hedging within the alliance. Japan has certainly played a brilliant hand in its minimalist military post–September 11 contribution in Afghanistan and Iraq, extracting maximum political gain from the United States. By using concepts of “situational need” and simply restating vague commitments to Japan’s defense first made between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon, Tokyo has also managed, to some degree, to give Washington the run-around regarding Japan’s commitment to a Taiwan contingency. Yet even as this “cat and mouse game” continues within the alliance, the United States remains the big tom-cat, continually narrowing the parameters within which Japan can dodge and weave. Japan’s actions in Afghanistan and Iraq set precedents and have begun to break down
constitutional prohibitions that mean that the United States will always come back and ask for more each time. Japan’s sphere of autonomy is thus shrinking. Japan has also entered into projects, such as BMD, creating technological, industrial, tactical, strategic, and political linkages to the United States that pin Japan down by the tail. Finally, when the United States decides to put its big paws down firmly, Japan is likely to become trapped underneath them. We see this in Iran, where Japan has worked overtime to maintain autonomy but ultimately knows it must cede to demands for U.S. economic pressure on Iran. I argue that we may also see Japan cede to U.S. pressure on North Korea and possibly even Taiwan.

Hence, my analysis differs from that of Samuels; while I see Japan seeking to hedge, Tokyo’s options are shrinking rather than widening. Samuels provides a masterful analysis; the fact that there is so much to discuss is a reflection of its sheer quality and depth. Samuel’s and Pyle’s works will be central texts in any debate on Japan’s security policy for years to come. But, to mix metaphors further, my main critique is that I am dubious that Japan can instrumentalize the Goldilocks scenario. If we follow the tale through, we might recall that feeling she had it just right, Goldilocks fell complacently into a deep sleep, only to be jolted awake by the three bears coming home, and then she ran out of the door screaming uncontrollably into the wild forest. Are North Korea, China, and Russia perhaps the three bears in this analogy, and is the United States the only safe haven to which Japan can run? ❇️

Author’s Response:
How Japan Balances Strategy and Constraint

Richard J. Samuels

There is only one thing more flattering for an academic than having one’s work read and responded to thoughtfully by one’s peers. That would be to have one’s work paired with that of a colleague as towering as Ken Pyle.

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I am twice blessed and very grateful to the authors for participating in this roundtable.

Three themes run through the comments that are directed specifically to *Securing Japan*. The first, raised by both Mike Mochizuki and Christopher Hughes, is the limitations of the Goldilocks metaphor to describe changes in the balance of Japanese security preferences. On my analysis both of the domestic security discourse and of the strategic options under construction, I posited that Japanese strategists were likely to begin worrying more about entanglement in U.S. misadventures and less about the Yoshida-era constraints that limited their predecessors. I suggested this would result in a new national strategic equilibrium, which a more muscular Japan further distancing itself from the United States. Greater strength and independence will define, I maintained, the successor to the Yoshida Doctrine—the fourth national security consensus in modern Japanese history. Mochizuki and Hughes both doubt that Japan created such options for itself. In a particularly fetching turn, Hughes reminds us that Goldilocks actually fled the house when the bears came home. In fact, when I last spoke at the University of Washington, Ken Pyle himself raised the very same question—Wouldn’t the Goldilocks solution depend upon the nature of China’s rise?

Well, yes it would. I did not state this as unequivocally in the book, though I wish I had: all bets are off if China’s rise is aggressive. While there is still no obvious, robust alternative to the U.S. alliance for Japanese strategists, much lies beneath the U.S.-Japan bear hug. Hughes makes the point most sharply. He sees an increasingly entangled alliance further entrapping and confounding Japanese planners. Hughes disagrees with my view that the Japanese are creating options, insisting that Tokyo is creating further dependence instead. Yet as I wrote in *Securing Japan*, and as I think the evidence still indicates, Japanese strategists deserve more credit. They know the difference between “separable” and “separate.” Whereas separable characterizes most of the capabilities under development, separate characterizes a future against which they are determined to hedge. In an example that postdates the completion of *Securing Japan*, Tokyo undertook yet another study of its nuclear option after the most recent North Korean nuclear tests. This time, however, Tokyo added a new twist by beginning to interrogate U.S. commitment. Seeking clarification of U.S. reassurances, Tokyo requested consultations with Washington to specify the mechanisms of extended deterrence. Japanese strategists understand their limits and, if necessary, consider substituting their own capabilities. As I argue in *Securing Asia*, sovereignty has never been far from the top of Japan’s national security agenda—even when Tokyo is hugging Washington most tightly.
This point is related to the second theme raised by the reviewers in this roundtable—the role of the United States in Asian security. As Ming Wan notes, abandonment and entanglement cut both ways. Washington can worry as much about being entangled in Japanese disputes as Tokyo can about U.S. ones. T.J. Pempel points out, and as heard with increasing frequency in the media, that the inherited rules of diplomatic and economic engagement in Asia seem to be changing. Bilateralism—the hub and spokes model that gave Washington enormous leverage for so long in Asia—may be giving way to a new regional security architecture. The questions here, just as in the case of Goldilocks above, is whither the United States? And does China’s rise not perforce involve the relative decline of the United States? Will there be a role for the United States in an East Asia where both China and Japan have risen?

I believe that as the balance of power in East Asia shifts, the relative influence of the United States will decline. The “big paws” of the United States that Chris Hughes refers to are sure to leave smaller footprints over time. Still, I emphatically argue that the answer to the last question is yes, the United States is in East Asia to stay. A recent experience in Tokyo suggested how Washington’s role might change. A group of Japanese friends and I attended a concert at the Bunkamura theater in Shibuya featuring two brilliant musicians, one a Japanese samisen player, the other a Chinese kyoko player. Individually, they made wonderful music on their stringed instruments. But their attempts to play together, just the two of them, failed at first; their music was harsh and discordant. As it turned out, however, each had also studied jazz. When a jazz pianist came on stage, the three of them generated some of the most thrilling music I had heard in years. Beyond the music, however, I was struck by the metaphor—that Americans can help the Chinese and the Japanese engage one another innovatively and productively without dominating their discourse.

Finally is the theme of soft power—an issue mentioned by Pempel, but that got shorter shrift in the “threat based” analysis in Securing Japan than would have been optimal. Joseph Nye, of course, owns the concept and has done us all a great service by clarifying the various dimensions of power in a changing international order. He reminds us that there is considerable power in the magnet as well as in the sharp point of the spear. Attraction and inspiration exist alongside bullying and buying as a source of power.

By stressing the persistent importance of national autonomy and prestige in Japanese security discourse, Securing Japan tries to unwrap some of the soft power calculations made by Japanese foreign and security policymakers. Tokyo understands that military and political analysts attempt to measure the capability to coerce and to conquer by relying too heavily on defense
budgets, population size, energy consumption, steel production, and other material surrogates for power. These things are critically important, of course, but we do not always do justice to the non-material elements of military power. Japanese policymakers have observed how often—as in the cases of Vietnam and now Iraq—policy planners mistakenly ignore (or discount) determination, willingness to sacrifice, and other values. They know that guns take a state only so far—sometimes in the wrong direction. Moral authority is a resource that requires nurturance too.

Here Goldilocks reappears (sorry). While caught up in a textbook security dilemma, Tokyo and Beijing are also searching for the right balance between deployment of hard and soft power resources. Japan is credited for its Gross National Cool while redefining security policy to meet military threats. Pursuing its diplomatic “charm offensive,” China is not unaware that its rise and military buildup could cause instability in the region and beyond. Both countries seem intent on crafting soft power from abundant economic resources—what we might call a “rich nation, attractive culture” strategy, in contrast to the better known, and mutually feared “rich nation, strong army” strategy. There is no “magic equilibrium,” of course. An increase in soft power cannot guarantee peace and prosperity in Asia, but analysis of these dynamics is critical for understanding where the security of the region—and of the world—will be in twenty years.

Culture and commerce—like bombs and rockets—are never fully sufficient to move world affairs. A nation’s values and moral authority are just as important. As the 2004 Araki Commission Report indicated, Japanese leaders already recognize that states, like leaders, can do more than bully and buy—they realize that states can also inspire. Put differently, while geopolitics are a constraint, they are not forever fixed. Smart leaders in both countries realize that a Goldilocks strategy that attempts to soften the harder edges of national power in both Japan and China is best for the region and the world. The rest of us have to hope that they prevail and get it “just right.”

At the end of the day, there are challenges for each of us. For Japan, the challenge is to resolve the history issue. I have been encouraged by the way Prime Minister Abe has tried to fix the broken relationship with China inherited from Prime Minister Koizumi. His first capital visit after assuming his duties in October 2006 was Beijing, and apparently Abe said what the Chinese wanted to hear about Yasukuni, about Prime Minister Murayama’s 1995 apology, and even about the war responsibility of his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke. As a result, the Sino-Japanese joint history commission is back on track. Bilateral talks regarding the East China Sea boundaries and military-to-
military exchanges have also resumed. Perhaps Abe will be Japan’s Goldilocks. Or, to stick with the theme of Northern European children’s stories, perhaps Abe will more closely resemble the wolf in sheep’s clothing; he certainly appeared in that guise when fumbling for an explanation in the case of the comfort women issue.

The challenge for China is how to become socialized into a world order with rules and norms valuing democracy and human rights. Beijing’s test earlier this year of an anti-satellite weapon was not a step in the right direction. For the rest of us—particularly the United States—the challenge is to socialize ourselves to an emerging new order that makes room not only for Japanese sovereignty, but also for Chinese power—even in terms of moral authority.

Author’s Response:
The Primacy of Foreign Policy in Modern Japan

Kenneth B. Pyle

I am honored to have this group of leading political scientists commenting on my book and to have it paired with the valuable new work of Dick Samuels, one of our preeminent interpreters of Japanese politics. My intention in writing this book was not to “apply a political science theory,” as Mike Mochizuki suggested in his thoughtful commentary—although I found the international relations literature immensely suggestive. Rather, as T. J. Pempel observed, my approach was that of an historian working inductively from study of the evidence provided by the Meiji, prewar, and postwar eras where I have done my research. My interest was in what has motivated the Japanese in their foreign policy. What were the sources of Japan’s international conduct? Were there recurrent patterns or characteristics? Does Japan have a distinctive

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style? Above all, I wanted to understand what are “the profound forces” that have shaped modern Japan.¹

I found that, owing in great part to its extraordinary staying power over this entire history, the conservative elite was the source of Japan’s distinctive style and strategy in dealing with the external order. Having deep roots in Japanese culture and history, this style and strategy manifested itself in a cluster of characteristics, especially in an extraordinary attentiveness to the configuration of power in the international system and its implications for Japan’s interests. So vulnerable was Japan as a backward and resource poor state that foreign policy had to take priority. Each time the international order changed, Japan’s pragmatic and opportunistic elite ensured that the nation would organize itself internally to succeed externally.

Each of the major changes in Japanese strategy has been an adaptation to the new configuration of power in the world. Each however has been different—a variation on the theme of the primacy of foreign affairs in shaping a strategy and its supporting institutions. With the end of the Cold War system, the Yoshida Doctrine, the most brilliant and complex of all the modern adaptations to the external order, has been steadily unraveling. Seven of the eight self-binding restrictions that had been adopted to preclude entanglement in foreign commitments are being incrementally modified. These restrictions which were the essence of this grand strategy are the Eight No’s: no dispatch of JSDF abroad, no collective defense arrangements, no power projection ability, no more than 1% of GNP for defense, no nuclear arms, no sharing of military technology, no exporting of arms, no military use of space. Only the nuclear weapons restriction remains untouched (although now openly discussed). Because these restrictions were self-imposed, Japan has been able to calibrate the pace of change, as its leaders assess developments in the still unformed new international order.

As the Yoshida Doctrine is slowly displaced, domestic institutions are correspondingly changing. Wherever one looks on the contemporary scene there are tell-tale signs of change: constitutional reinterpretation, the new Ministry of Defense, revision of the Fundamental Law of Education, strengthening of the weak prime ministership, realignment of the political parties, a surge in public respect for the SDF, new attention to political (rather than simply economic) intelligence. Having mentioned intelligence, one interesting sign of change is a new vigor in tightening military secrecy. The

SDF was always a leaking sieve. Recently, however, Tokyo has begun to pursue and prosecute MSDF officers for their laxness in handling of highly sensitive data related to Aegis destroyers.

Given the uncertainty in the region, it is impossible to predict what the new strategy may be or when it will coalesce. Earlier strategies evolved over long periods of time—a decade or two. At the present time Japan is moving incrementally, preserving a certain amount of freedom within the alliance while doing just enough to preserve it. Dick Samuels lays stress on this hedging in his valuable analysis of the security debates. His work clarifies the thinking behind Japan’s often opaque political discourse. But I believe that these debates are contingent. It would not be correct to assume that a debate results in a new foreign policy; that would be according too much influence to the persuasive power of debate and ideas. I myself spent a good deal of research and writing time analyzing the foreign policy debates during the Nakasone years, but ultimately felt it was necessary to find deeper structural sources of decision and policymaking.

Mike Mochizuki rightly characterizes my feeling that it is “premature” to say what Japan’s new grand strategy will be. There are too many unresolved questions about the present international structure for a pragmatic and accommodative elite to make lasting commitments. East Asia is in a kind of interregnum, a period of flux when the shape of a new order is not yet apparent. The end of the cold war was not as decisive in Asia as it was in Europe. Korea remains divided, Taiwan unresolved. Japan and Russia are still without a peace treaty. Governments that are at least nominally communist hold on to power. The U.S. security structure designed for the Cold War remains. The United States behaves as a kind of “regent” of the interregnum, maintaining order for the time being, but a new, proactive, competitive Asia is emergent.

While old issues remain unresolved new ones are rapidly evolving. The newly prosperous Asian nations have entered into a phase of rapid economic growth as part of a massive shift of world power. Asia is being knit together into a thriving region of technological progress and improved communications, which is contributing to the expansion of interdependence and intraregional flows of trade and investment. Efforts to build multilateral institutions where none had previously existed have produced new but fragile organizations. But despite these hopeful integrative trends, there is also the prospect of divisive forces—strategic rivalries, arms races, competition for resources, border disputes, and rampant nationalisms. Asia lacks a fixed regional structure, a recognized legitimate order, to cope readily with the turbulence of its new dynamism.
Japan's new strategy will take shape, as occurred several times before, as Tokyo adjusts to major changes in its external environment. The present discourse may seem to point to a Goldilocks strategy—not too close to the United States but not too far. If, however, to take just one example, it became clear that China was building a blue water navy and intending to become a maritime power to protect its oil lifeline and other interests—and there is growing evidence that it will—the Goldilocks strategy would collapse. Once again the vulnerability of a trading state that is resource poor would haunt Japanese leadership. As Christopher Hughes concludes, when the bears return Goldilocks is sent fleeing. Likewise, as Ming Wan suggests, the future role of the United States in Asia offers different scenarios for the future and will have incalculable influence on how Japan formulates its future strategy. As I write in the book, a distracted or disengaged United States could lead Japan to cut a deal with China.

It is not only the foreign demands that need to be accommodated. A foreign policy strategy must be accepted at home. The shrewd accommodation of the home front that the Yoshida doctrine achieved was so successful that Igarashi Takeshi referred to it as a “domestic foreign policy system.” Japanese society today is utterly different from the early postwar days. The Left-Right divisiveness that the Yoshida school managed so well is gone. In place of the old political divisiveness is a much more independent-minded electorate, in no small part owing to a greater political awareness among Japanese women. A pervasive dissatisfaction with the old politics presents a much different challenge for the Heisei generation of politicians in trying to shape a domestic consensus behind a new national strategic posture. Such a consensus is not in sight.

Still, for structural reasons it will almost certainly be the foreign challenges that drive Japanese politics—what kind of rising power China becomes, the demands of a globalized capitalism, how Korea is reunified, whether America finally formulates an Asian strategy, how Japan and Russia settle their differences. Because accommodation and opportunism continue to be so characteristic of Japanese leadership, it is premature to predict meaningfully how Japan will replace the Yoshida doctrine and adapt to such an indeterminate future. Japan is living in the in-between times.

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2 As Joseph Nye writes: “Japan has played a unique role in world history. [In the Meiji period] it was the first Asian country to encounter the forces of globalization, master and then make them serve its own interests…In the post-second-world war period, Japan again used the forces of globalization to reinvent itself as an economic superpower that became the envy of the world. As academic Kenneth Pyle argues in his new book, Japan Rising, these reinventions were responses to external shifts in world politics. Now, with the growth of Chinese power, one of the great questions of this century will be how Japan responds.” See Joseph Nye, “The Third Coming,” South China Morning Post, June 14, 2007.