North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015
Jonathan D. Pollack
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This essay evaluates three alternative scenarios for North Korea’s nuclear
weapons development over the coming decade: (1) pursuit of a symbolic
nuclear capability, (2) pursuit of an operational nuclear deterrent, and (3) a
deficient or failed effort to achieve an operational capability.
Main Findings
North Korea’s weapons are now a fact, not a bargaining chip. Absent
fundamental internal change in North Korea or extraordinary changes in
the negotiating strategies of the U.S. and other powers, there is virtually
no possibility that North Korea will irrevocably yield the totality of these
capabilities. Given that Pyongyang still confronts major technical hurdles
if it expects to proceed to an operational deterrent force, however, the most
likely outcome would be a symbolic nuclear capability. North Korea may
be prepared to restrict some nuclear activities in return for guarantees and
commitments from the U.S. and other powers. Even if such a move would
not entail a definitive end to the program, this possibility warrants careful
consideration by the U.S. and others seeking a negotiated end to Pyongyang’s
nuclear program. It would not be prudent, however, to anticipate an early
end to Pyongyang’s program or to the dangers this program poses both for
security in East Asia and for the future viability of the non-proliferation
regime.
Policy Implications
There are four immediate policy considerations that the international
community would benefit from exploring:
- determining additional measures to discourage or impede North Korea’s
future weapons development, which in the near term should focus on
convincing North Korea to forego additional nuclear tests or further tests
of ballistic missiles
- reiterating to Pyongyang that any transfer of nuclear materials, technologies,
or completed weapons outside its borders would constitute a grave danger
to the international community as a whole
- imposing additional costs on North Korea for any further nuclear tests
- fully weighing the trade-offs in pursuing partial steps to restrict nuclear
weapons development versus pursuit of maximal policy goals