Russia–North Korea Rapprochement and Its Implications for Security in Northeast Asia

Could you outline the key tenets of the new mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea and explain how it differs from the prior agreement that North Korea had signed with the Soviet Union in 1961?

Technically speaking, the only significant difference between the 1961 and 2024 versions is the explicit reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter (authorizing the use of collective self-defense in the event of armed attack), as well as to the unspecified domestic laws and regulations of both countries. This can be interpreted as providing one side (namely Russia) with a convenient legalistic excuse not to get involved in a potential conflict. However, there is very little need for such an excuse because there already exist precedents that clearly demonstrate Russia’s reluctance to get involved in any conflict initiated by North Korea.

For example, on January 23, 1968, North Korea captured the USS Pueblo and its crew of 83 sailors off the coast of North Korea. Though North Korea released the crew in December 1968, the Soviet Union, China, and much of the developing world viewed its actions as overly provocative. At the time, the Soviet side notified the North Korean leaders that they should not count on Soviet military involvement in the event of a war because the entire conflict was triggered by North Korea’s unilateral actions. The same caveat likely would be applicable now during a crisis caused by North Korea.

Thus, one should not overestimate the significance of the new treaty. Russia will join forces with North Korea if it is deemed necessary and profitable by Moscow and will remain idle if Moscow decides that it is not in Russia’s interests to get involved in a war. The amount of noise generated by the treaty is surprising, especially considering that the 1961 treaty between North Korea and China is still operational and has exactly the same mutual defense clause. Key tenets of the new pact include a requirement to provide military and other assistance in the event that either country is invaded and a commitment to oppose “unilateral compulsory measures” (i.e., sanctions).

In what ways might Russia’s increased support for North Korea, as demonstrated by this defense pact, shape North Korea’s policies and approaches to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula?

The real impact will likely not come from the treaty but from the economic exchanges with Russia. Right now, Russia is purchasing North Korean ammunition at a relatively high price, which is somewhat akin to North Korea winning the lottery. However, such a level of economic interaction is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run. After the hostilities in Ukraine end, trade between Russia and North Korea is expected to nosedive—unless, that is, Russia is willing to subsidize such trade from its own national budget, which is quite unlikely.

Regarding relations with the United States, North Korea’s goals have not changed. Ideally, the Kim regime would like to achieve implicit or explicit recognition as a de facto nuclear state by Washington, establish formal diplomatic relations, and have all sanctions removed. The situation with South Korea is more complicated. Again, it would be unwise to read too much into the recent two-state pronouncement. For the North, South Korea has always been, primarily, an ATM—a source of almost unconditional, unilateral economic and material support. Of course, such support was delivered only when the South Korean nationalist Left (i.e., “progressives”) were in power. Now, due to sanctions, South Korea, irrespective of who is in power, is unable to play such a role. This means that, from Pyongyang’s viewpoint, improving relations with Seoul is essentially a waste of time. Relations with South Korea are valuable to the North only as long as they generate income.

The UN Security Council, with Russia’s support, has previously issued resolutions and imposed sanctions on North Korea over its nuclear weapons program. How will UN efforts toward achieving nonproliferation be affected by stronger Russia-DPRK ties?

Russia is (almost) openly violating UN Security Council resolutions, and this will not help maintain the proliferation regime. As noted above, Russia has purchased ammunition for use in Ukraine in violation of UN sanctions, and earlier this year it vetoed the renewal of a UN panel that previously monitored North Korea’s nuclear program. Russia is openly challenging the UN’s position, while China stands behind, implicitly supporting such an attitude. As a matter of fact, Moscow is likely losing its erstwhile steadfast support for nonproliferation and becoming increasingly ready to accept a world with a much larger number of nuclear-armed states. Right now, it is more vital for Russia to supply its troops fighting in Ukraine with ammunition than to remain a loyal and law-abiding member of the UN-dominated international community. How the war in Ukraine ends and the extent to which Russia remains isolated from the West afterward will likely dictate how much Putin prioritizes continued cooperation with North Korea.

How will the new mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea impact each country’s relationship with China? Could these countries form a trilateral pact, or, conversely, could the Russia-DPRK agreement give rise to tensions in Beijing’s bilateral relationships with Moscow and Pyongyang?

So far, there are many signs that relations between North Korea and China have significantly worsened—and keep going downhill. According to some reports, Kim Jong-un recently even said that North Korea has no need to be excessively attentive to Chinese demands and even described China as Korea’s “old foe.” While these reports are not 100% reliable, they are still plausible. At any rate, there are highly visible signs of the ongoing cooling down in relations between Beijing and Pyongyang. The initiative certainly comes from North Korea, whose leaders began to dream about reviving the equidistance policy they executed so brilliantly from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, playing Moscow and Beijing against each other. They clearly want to do this again.

However, this time the strategy will not be very successful because, unlike during 1960–88, Russia is a junior partner to China and completely dependent on trade with it to maintain both troops on the battlefield and high approval ratings for Putin’s government. Therefore, if China were to become seriously unhappy about the relationship between Russia and the DPRK, a couple of phone calls from Comrade Xi Jinping to Mr. Putin could solve the problem instantly. It is unclear whether North Korean leaders understand how different the world is now from the world of the 1960s equidistance diplomacy.

From a U.S. policy perspective, what role might the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership have in addressing concerns emanating from the strengthened Russia-DPRK relationship? Will this stronger relationship encourage action by countries previously less involved in Northeast Asia, whether they be European or other Asian states?

One should not be too optimistic about the willingness of other Asian nations, let alone European countries, to become involved in Northeast Asian crisis situations. Yet, even though the new pact between Russia and the DPRK should not be taken too seriously, it provides a good pretext for the United States, South Korea, and Japan to further strengthen trilateral cooperation. This is an expected and quite reasonable reaction. Moreover, a North Korea with Russian technology and improved nuclear capabilities could provide further impetus for the closer ROK-Japan ties started at Camp David and would encourage continued trilateral military exercises to deter North Korea.

Andrei Nikolaevich Lankov is Director of the Korea Risk Group, the parent company of NK News and NK Pro. Dr. Lankov is a scholar of Asia and a specialist in Korean studies.

This interview was conducted by Andrew Pruden while an intern with the Political and Security Affairs group at NBR.