Navigating Countercurrents: Manila’s Intricate Dynamics with Beijing and Taipei

As tensions rise across the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the Philippines finds itself in a pivotal role in East Asia’s increasingly complex strategic environment. The country is caught between its security alliance with the United States, its economic relations with China, and its geographic proximity to Taiwan—a potential major flashpoint for conflict between the major powers. Its entanglements with both major powers already situate the Philippines at the center of U.S.-China strategic competition, but the triangular dynamic of its relations with China and Taiwan underscores the Philippines’ increasingly precarious position. Domestic political considerations further complicate its situation and drive periodic recalibrations in its foreign policy approach.

Given this challenging strategic context, Manila under the current administration of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is compelled to respond with prudence and agility to the evolving risks and opportunities inherent in its engagements with Beijing and Taipei by pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy that balances security constraints and economic imperatives, while safeguarding national interests and maximizing strategic autonomy. Achieving this balance, however, is increasingly difficult as regional tensions rise and domestic political pressures intensify. This commentary examines the Philippines’ evolving relationships with China and Taiwan and assesses Manila’s approach in balancing its strategic priorities in light of heightened levels of U.S. engagement, China’s aggression, and cross-strait tensions.

The Philippines’ Triangular Relationship with China and Taiwan

In a volatile and uncertain environment, the Philippines’ strategic interests are clear: the defense of territorial integrity and sovereignty, sustained economic development, internal sociopolitical cohesion, the protection of Filipino nationals at home and abroad, and the promotion of regional peace and stability. The escalation of tensions in the South China Sea and the deterioration of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait present clear and persistent challenges to these interests, particularly in view of China’s increasing political, military, and economic coercion. Maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is in the interest of the Philippines because any violent conflict in its neighborhood will have immediate and disastrous ramifications. Moreover, the current situation prevents Beijing from assuming complete operational control of strategic waterways vital to Philippine national security. Historically, the Philippines’ unique geostrategic space has predisposed it as a target and a battleground for major powers vying for greater influence in the region, and this legacy continues to shape its vulnerabilities and strategic imperatives in bilateral relations with its neighbors today.

The Philippines considers China as a close neighbor with long-standing sociocultural, historical, and economic ties, but bilateral relations reached a nadir in 2024. Although the Marcos administration has sought to pursue a nuanced China policy, emphasizing a “friend to all, enemy to none” stance, aggressive Chinese activity in the waters surrounding the archipelago has endangered Filipino sailors and coast guard personnel and continues to compromise maritime safety and freedom of navigation in one of the busiest sea lanes in the world.[1] Thus, the Philippines decided to increase its defensive measures, one of which is to strengthen its security alliance with the United States. Although Beijing continues to paint Manila as Washington’s regional “pawn,” the Philippines’ increased defensive measures are a sovereign response to China’s repeated incursion, aggression, and coercion and are aimed at protecting national sovereignty rather than reciprocating China’s aggression.

Despite these disputes, the Philippines still recognizes China’s major role in its economic growth and infrastructure development. China remains its top trade partner and is a source of opportunities in critical sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, and renewable energy.[2] Diplomatic channels between the Philippines and China remain open, albeit less robust than before, and both countries continue to invest in people-to-people exchanges. Amid heightening tensions, the Philippines and China conduct regular consultations that highlight the necessity of dialogue between the two countries. However, aside from the territorial and maritime disputes, there is increasing distrust and growing concern about China’s retaliatory actions in the economic sphere and its interference in Philippine domestic political affairs.[3] Moreover, as China continues to test the United States’ commitment to the region by pressuring U.S. allies, the Philippines continues to drift further away from China, thus limiting Manila’s elbow room in developing bilateral cooperative activities with Beijing.

Meanwhile, as the Philippines’ relations with Taiwan are largely shaped by its relations with China, practical cooperation continues to expand. While formal diplomatic ties and official security cooperation with Taiwan are precluded by the one-China policy and Manila’s wariness of further provoking China, people-to-people relations are improving, and two-way trade has been on the rise.[4] Taiwan remains a crucial labor market for Filipino workers, with around 170,000 Filipinos contributing substantially to Philippine household incomes through remittances.[5] The implementation of Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy jump-started the upward trajectory of economic relations between Taiwan and the Philippines. Economic activity is expected to expand with the Philippines’ relaxation of its ban on government officials seeking economic and investment opportunities from Taiwan.[6] The souring of relations with Beijing due to Chinese politico-military coercion also presents a period of opportunity for Manila to strengthen ties with Taipei, particularly through countering disinformation and increasing democratic resilience against authoritarian influence.

Strategic Priorities and Challenges

Recognizing its important position as a neighbor and partner to both China and Taiwan, coupled with its desire to not upset the delicate balance in the Taiwan Strait, the Philippines has sought to implement a strategy to engage both countries from a stronger position. At the same time, it seeks to reduce overreliance on both the United States and China for security and economic interests, respectively. The Philippines’ strategic priorities are thus engagement, conflict prevention, and diversification to allow for greater autonomy in the face of several constraints in its decision-making.

Conflict prevention is the top concern for the Philippines in its triangular relations with China and Taiwan. Manila seeks a nuanced and careful approach toward de-escalation of its own heightened tensions with Beijing, focusing on conducting adroit negotiation, building domestic capability, and rallying the support of its international partners. Measures to harden the Philippines’ defense posture and increase its deterrent capability in Northern Luzon are designed to close gaps in maritime governance and to bolster the country’s position for negotiation with China. In the event of complications in the Taiwan Strait, the Philippines is expected to prioritize actions to safeguard the lives and liberty of the Filipino people.

Further, the country’s current strategy of diversifying security and economic partners seeks to mitigate its dependence on the two great powers and will enable the Philippines to pursue its strategic interests while reducing strategic vulnerabilities brought about by great-power competition.

Some steps the country has taken include deepening security cooperation with Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and several European nations to develop a credible defense posture; crafting a policy environment conducive to a domestic defense industrial base; diversifying partners for infrastructure development; negotiating economic agreements with various partners; and participating in regional dialogues for greater economic integration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its partners. Initially, the Philippines has achieved moderate success in deepening existing partnerships and in forging new ones. However, resource constraints, lack of awareness and support among policymakers and elected officials, and weak institutional transparency measures, among other factors, still pose challenges to the country’s bid for greater strategic autonomy.

There are other noteworthy challenges to this strategy. The most pressing concern is the deepening division in the country’s elite, which threatens national cohesion. Political cleavages between President Marcos and Vice President Sara Duterte, who were running mates during the 2022 elections, expose the government’s deep vulnerability to personalistic politics. This, in turn, creates distractions that direct national attention away from consequential economic development and security issues, further sowing political discord that impedes social cohesion between the already fragmented islands of the archipelago. The results of the 2025 midterm elections, which reflect eroding support for the current administration, have significant repercussions for the 2028 presidential elections, when potential political realignments will possibly steer Philippine foreign policy in a different direction.

Another challenge is that the Philippines has not been able to tap into China’s economic resources and maximize opportunities for engagement as much as its Southeast Asian neighbors have done. This is due not only to its increasingly hard-line stance against and deepening distrust of Beijing, but also to the Philippines’ fragmented governance and weak institutional capacity to address and insulate itself from foreign interference operations such as elite co-optation and disinformation.

Conclusion

As the strategic environment becomes ever more complicated, the Philippines finds itself cast into a critical role in Southeast Asia that it did not necessarily seek but cannot afford to ignore. The country must navigate growing U.S.-China rivalry, avoid entrapment in a Taiwan conflict, manage economic vulnerabilities to Chinese retaliation, and contain domestic political volatility. Although deepening security cooperation with the United States reflects the Philippines’ recognition of the need for a credible deterrent capability, closer alignment with Washington complicates Manila’s strategic calculus in a Taiwan contingency and weaken its efforts to maintain a balanced approach toward China. Strategic success will require skillful diplomacy, a coherent defense policy, and economic diversification. Ultimately, the trajectory of Manila’s future foreign policy toward Beijing and Taipei will depend on its ability to sustain economic growth, strengthen alliances, leverage regional mechanisms, and maintain strategic flexibility in a rapidly evolving strategic environment.

Dianne Co Despi is a member of the Corps of Professors, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and a PhD candidate in political science and international relations at the University of Delaware. Her main research interests are international security cooperation and maritime security.

Endnotes

[1] “Marcos Charts Independent Foreign Policy, ‘Friend to All’ Stance,” Government of the Philippines, Press Release, July 25, 2022, https://pco.gov.ph/news_releases/marcos-charts-independent-foreign-policy-friend-to-all-stance; and Raissa Robles, “Why 2024 Was the ‘Most Violent, Dangerous’ Point in Philippine-China Ties, and What’s Next, South China Morning Post, January 2, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3293073/why-2024-was-most-violent-dangerous-point-philippine-china-ties-and-whats-next.

[2] Philippine Statistics Authority, “International Merchandise Trade Statistics of the Philippines 2024,” Special Release, March 26, 2025, https://psa.gov.ph/system/files/Tsd/1_Textual%20Analysis%20for%20the%20IMTS%202024.pdf.

[3] Sarah Seah et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2025 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2025), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/The-State-of-SEA-2025-1.pdf.

[4] Bernardo M. Villegas, “The Philippine economy in 2025: Look to Taiwan,” BusinessWorld, February 26, 2025, https://www.bworldonline.com/opinion/2025/02/26/655475/the-philippine-economy-in-2025-look-to-taiwan.

[5] Aaron Jed Rabena, “Taiwan Policy and the Philippines,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/08/27/2003822814.

[6] Adrian H. Halili, “Philippines Eases Official Restrictions on Taiwan Investment-Related Visits,” BusinessWorld, April 21, 2025, https://www.bworldonline.com/the-nation/2025/04/21/667083/philippines-eases-official-restrictions-on-taiwan-investment-related-visits.