Entangled Fronts: The Philippines’ Anxiety over a Taiwan Crisis

Trends under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. reveal the Philippines’ growing anxiety over a Taiwan crisis. In 2023, Manila expanded its Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with Washington, adding four more sites where the United States could rotationally deploy troops, weaponry, and equipment. Unprecedentedly, two sites—a naval base and a joint-use airport—are on the northern coast of Luzon island less than 500 kilometers from Taiwan. The next year, Manila unveiled the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC), which reorients the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) toward external security. Notably, CADC calls for AFP deployments not only in the West Philippine Sea but also in the Luzon Strait, the waterway separating the Philippines and Taiwan. In 2024, Manila allowed Washington to deploy Typhon missile systems in northern Luzon, probably staying within range of potential targets in Taiwan and southern China. The Philippines also set up a coast guard monitoring station near the Bashi Channel in the Luzon Strait. Also that year, the Philippines joined the United States and Japan in their first-ever trilateral summit, after which the three leaders issued a statement containing a “call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”[1]

Many analysts explain these trends by pointing to Marcos as a pro-U.S. leader, a stark contrast to his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, who was anti-U.S. and pro-China. But the Philippines’ anxiety over a Taiwan crisis predates Marcos, and the country’s actions reflect its self-interest in deterring China from becoming an adversary on two fronts: the West Philippine Sea and the Luzon Strait.

The Philippines’ Potential Entanglement in a Taiwan Crisis

The Marcos administration has underscored the inevitability of the Philippines’ involvement in a Taiwan crisis. In an interview in 2023, Marcos concluded that it was “hard to imagine a scenario where the Philippines will not somehow get involved.”[2] Later that year, the administration released the 2023–2028 National Security Policy (NSP), explicitly describing a Taiwan crisis as a “major concern.” In 2025, AFP chief of staff General Romeo Brawner Jr. echoed Marcos’s sentiment: “If something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved.”[3] A few weeks later, the AFP and the U.S. armed forces opened the 40th Balikatan exercises, which included drills in northern Luzon.

While keeping the Philippines’ one-China policy, Marcos is working to foster friendlier relations with Taiwan. Breaking protocol, he publicly congratulated Lai Ching-te for winning the Taiwanese presidential election.[4] In 2025, he also eased restrictions against government officials traveling to Taiwan—a shift in Philippine policy since 1987—to deepen the country’s economic ties with the self-ruled island.

The 2023–28 NSP reveals that the administration is concerned about the impact of a Taiwan crisis on the safety of over 170,000 Filipino workers on the island. Indeed, Marcos has acknowledged that the new EDCA sites in northern Luzon could prove useful for repatriating Filipinos from Taiwan.[5] The AFP has further clarified that Philippine military planning for a Taiwan contingency is focused on noncombatant evacuation.[6] The NSP also reveals that the Philippines is concerned about its geographic proximity. Indeed, to forcibly take over Taiwan, China is likely to use Philippine waters, especially in the Bashi Channel. This would enable its ships and aircraft to reach eastern Taiwan while avoiding the East China Sea, where U.S. and Japanese forces could surveil and intercept them.

The NSP is silent, however, on what to do if the United States becomes a party to an armed conflict over Taiwan and triggers the mutual defense treaty. Although there is vagueness on whether the Philippines would be obliged to send its military,[7] the government might be compelled to do so if Washington were to threaten to withdraw U.S. support in the West Philippine Sea and for the AFP’s modernization. Still, Marcos has said that the EDCA sites would not be used for “offensive action.”[8]

Outlook

Filipinos have conflicting attitudes about a Taiwan crisis. On the one hand, they are wary of the Philippines’ involvement and fear that China would attack northern Luzon because of the EDCA sites and Typhon systems there. Among those who stoke this fear are former president Duterte and Senator Imee Marcos, President Marcos’s sister, who has become an ally of the Dutertes.[9] This fear could explain why around 86% of Filipinos in 2024 wanted the Philippines to remain neutral on a China-Taiwan conflict.[10] On the other hand, Filipinos deeply distrust China because of its aggression in the West Philippine Sea. They were also displeased when the Chinese ambassador to the Philippines questioned the safety of Filipinos in Taiwan in 2023 because of the new EDCA sites in northern Luzon.[11]

Still, when Filipino voters went to the polls for midterm elections in May 2025, a Taiwan crisis was not a top concern.[12] The Dutertes, though, made a strong showing after their slate won five of twelve open Senate seats, bolstered by public sympathy after the former president was arrested and handed over to the International Criminal Court in March 2025. If the Dutertes maintain their momentum until the presidential election in 2028, another of their own—the former president’s daughter and current vice president Sara Duterte—might win the highest office. That could mean a reversal of Philippine foreign policy on China and, by extension, Taiwan. Many expected Marcos to continue Rodrigo Duterte’s foreign policy, but he has forged his own path, and Sara Duterte is now seen as better poised to preserve her father’s legacy.

Ephemeral Entanglement on Taiwan?

The Philippine government may be unlikely to change course even with Sara Duterte as president. First, she has remained silent on the expanded EDCA and Typhon deployments and has refrained from commenting on Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea.[13] This may only be an electoral tactic. Overt alignment with China would probably dent her popularity, which has already taken a toll as she faces a potential impeachment challenge. If her tactic pays off and she wins the presidency in 2028, she could still pursue an appeasement policy toward China. Nonetheless, she would need to successfully contend with a military, bureaucracy, and public that are decidedly skeptical of China. Even her father failed to do so and was eventually convinced, in the latter years of his term, to pursue a more balanced Philippine foreign policy toward China.[14]

Second, the Philippines had been growing anxious about a Taiwan crisis even before the Marcos administration. The Duterte administration’s 2017–22 NSP mentioned a “China-Taiwan conflict” as among the “flashpoints of immediate concern to the Philippines.” The last Balikatan exercises under the Duterte administration in 2022 included drills in northern Luzon, which have been part of subsequent iterations of the exercises. The rise in Chinese exercises and other military activities around Taiwan since 2020, when the Taiwanese defense ministry began publishing reports of incursions past the median line in the Taiwan Strait, has alarmed the Philippine government. The AFP has also noticed increasing Chinese interest in the Philippines’ northernmost islands. In 2019 the Philippine Navy intervened to prevent a Chinese company from transforming Fuga Island in the Luzon Strait into a “smart city.”[15] Increasing Chinese influence has also been apparent in local governments in the Philippines’ northernmost provinces, especially Cagayan, whose governor since 2016, Manuel Mamba, has become a critic of the expanded EDCA.[16]

The Philippines’ Security Needs

Philippine interests in Taiwan are not ephemeral and would probably endure even after the Marcos administration because of alliance politics, deterrence, linkages with the West Philippine Sea issue, and the Philippines’ own security needs. The United States has been intensifying its commitment to Taiwan, and if backing that posture would allow the Philippines to keep U.S. support in the West Philippine Sea and for the AFP’s modernization—and perhaps attract more assistance—then Manila’s decision to expand the EDCA, the Balikatan exercises, and Typhon deployments into northern Luzon makes sense. Indeed, cooperation at most EDCA sites and during activities under the Balikatan exercises continues to focus on the West Philippine Sea. Although the initial Typhon deployments were in the northern front, a second deployment may come for the western front. Marcos bared the linkage between the northern and western fronts when he dared China to stop its aggression in the West Philippine Sea in exchange for removing the Typhon systems from northern Luzon.[17] Short of provoking China, Marcos has said that there is “no plan” to open more EDCA sites in northern Luzon or elsewhere.[18]

While the Philippines has no desire for direct conflict with China over Taiwan, it does have a strategic interest in ensuring Chinese leaders perceive an invasion as too costly to pursue. At present, the Philippines would like the status quo between China and Taiwan to be preserved. Insofar as expanding the EDCA, Balikatan exercises, and Typhon deployments into northern Luzon could contribute to deterrence, then Manila’s actions make sense. If China were to forcibly take over Taiwan while the Philippines is still modernizing its military, Beijing would have two fronts from where it could pressure Manila. The Philippines would then be forced to divide its limited assets between the northern and western fronts. The United States and other partners, especially Japan and South Korea, could find it harder to access the South China Sea because of Chinese naval and air presence around Taiwan. All these developments would result in a weaker defensive posture for the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea, and this could prove disastrous. A Chinese win in Taiwan could embolden Beijing to press claims in the South China Sea more aggressively.

Conclusion

As anxiety in the Philippines over a potential Taiwan crisis has grown, the government has been taking steps to prepare for such a contingency. Manila is responding not only to Washington’s intensifying commitment to Taiwan but also to the increasing Chinese presence, interest, and influence in the northern front. The West Philippine Sea remains a national security concern, but Manila is now recognizing that defense of that front is contingent on the Philippines’ capacity to defend all other maritime fronts, including in the north.

Edcel John A. Ibarra is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines Diliman. He is also Young Leader and U.S.-Philippines Alliance Next-Generation Leader at the Pacific Forum in Honolulu.

Endnotes

[1] “Joint Vision Statement from the Leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States,” Presidential Communications Office (Philippines), April 12, 2024, https://pco.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/20240412-Joint-Vision-Statement-from-the-Leaders-of-Japan.pdf.

[2] Cliff Venzon, “Marcos Says ‘Hard to Imagine’ Philippines Can Avoid Taiwan Conflict,” Nikkei Asia, February 12, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Marcos-says-hard-to-imagine-Philippines-can-avoid-Taiwan-conflict.

[3] “Philippines ‘Inevitably’ Involved If Taiwan Invaded: AFP Chief,” Agence France-Presse, April 2, 2025, available at https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2025/4/1/philippines-inevitably-involved-if-taiwan-invaded-afp-chief-0738.

[4] “Philippine President Congratulates Taiwan’s President-Elect, Strongly Opposed by China,” Associated Press, January 15, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/philippine-president-ferdinand-marcos-taiwan-presidential-elections-winner-lai-ching-te-15951596df0464b7d983b609e555e86c.

[5] Michael Martina, Don Durfee, and David Brunnstrom, “Marcos Says Philippines Bases Could Be ‘Useful’ If Taiwan Attacked,” Reuters, May 5, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/marcos-says-philippines-bases-could-be-useful-if-taiwan-attacked-2023-05-05.

[6] John Eric Mendoza, “Just a ‘Prudent Measure’: AFP Clarifies Chief’s Taiwan Remark,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 2, 2025, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/271391.

[7] See, for example, Joyce Ann L. Rocamora, “Mutual Defense Treaty Review Needed: Expert,” Philippine News Agency, March 3, 2019, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1063440.

[8] “PBBM: EDCA Sites Won’t Be Used for ‘Offensive Action’ but a Chance to Bolster PH Territorial Defense Initiatives,” Presidential Communications Office (Philippines), April 10, 2023, https://pco.gov.ph/news_releases/pbbm-edca-sites-wont-be-used-for-offensive-action-but-a-chance-to-bolster-ph-territorial-defense-initiatives.

[9] Rigoberto D. Tiglao, “Duterte: EDCA Camps Are U.S. ‘Platforms for War,’ Chinese Missiles’ Targets,” Manila Times, April 5, 2023, https://www.manilatimes.net/2023/04/05/opinion/columns/duterte-edca-camps-are-us-platforms-for-war-chinese-missiles-targets/1885765; and Maila Ager, “Imee Marcos Questions New EDCA Sites: Why a Stone’s Throw Away from Taiwan?” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 1, 2023, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/211570/imee-marcos-questions-new-edca-sites-why-a-stones-throw-away-from-taiwan.

[10] Raissa Robles, “Most Filipinos Say They Support Neutrality over Taiwan, Want Manila to Focus on Home Front,” South China Morning Post, May 29, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3264470/most-filipinos-say-they-support-neutrality-over-taiwan-want-manila-focus-home-front.

[11] Marlon Ramos and Tina G. Santos, “Chinese Embassy: Huang’s Remarks on Taiwan OFWs Taken ‘Out of Context,’” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 17, 2023, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/213497/chinese-embassy-huangs-remarks-on-taiwan-ofws-taken-out-of-context.

[12] Anna Feliciano Bajo, “Job Creation, Food Security Remain Top Concerns of Voters—SWS,” GMA Integrated News, May 1, 2025, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/944598/job-creation-food-security-remain-top-concerns-of-voters-sws/story/.

[13] Bongz Magsambol, “Sara Duterte on Continued China Bullying: No Comment,” Rappler, April 8, 2024, https://www.rappler.com/philippines/sara-duterte-response-continued-china-bullying-no-comment-april-8-2024/.

[14] Jay L. Batongbacal, “The Philippines and the South China Sea Arbitration Award: External Appeasement and Internal Dissension,” ISEAS Perspectives, September 24, 2021, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-126-the-philippines-and-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-award-external-appeasement-and-internal-dissension-by-jay-l-batongbacal.

[15] J.C. Gotinga, “PH Navy to Build Fuga Island Outpost Ahead of Chinese ‘Smart City’ Plan,” Cagayan Economic Zone Authority, November 14, 2019, https://ceza.gov.ph/ph-navy-to-build-fuga-island-outpost-ahead-of-chinese-smart-city-plan.

[16] See, for example, Aries A. Arugay et al., Localization of the United States–China Rivalry: Cases from the Philippines (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2025), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/trends-in-southeast-asia/localization-of-the-united-states-china-rivalry-cases-from-the-philippines-by-aries-a-arugay-miguel-antonio-v-hermo-edcel-john-a-ibarra-and-aletheia-kerygma-b-valenciano.

[17] Jim Gomez, “Philippine President Offers a Deal to China: Stop Sea Aggression and I’ll Return Missiles to U.S.,” Associated Press, January 30, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/china-philippines-us-missile-system-d2d7aeeaeef0ea9d93f105ae6614ab02.

[18] Darryl John Esguerra, “Marcos: No Plans for More EDCA Sites,” Philippine News Agency, April 15, 2024, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1222643.