Strengthening the Fabric, Tightening the Bonds: Taiwan’s Soft Power in the Philippines

Since adopting the one-China policy in 1975, the Philippines has recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the legal government of China. Yet, despite political isolation, the Republic of China (ROC) has managed to grow its economy and establish significant economic and cultural ties with Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines. Taiwan’s soft power is the primary driver of bilateral relations. This commentary will consider the connections between the two countries, which are largely observed in economic and business activities, as well as cross-cultural and people-to-people exchanges.

Navigating Diplomatic Constraints

Even though the relationship between Taiwan and the Philippines has been limited due to the latter’s adherence to the one-China policy, Taiwan’s economic impact in the Philippines remains remarkable. Over the past decades, the two sides have maintained their mutual respect through nondiplomatic relations. Such cooperation has been acceptable for Beijing in the realm of economics and at levels of low politics.

Taiwan’s economic and cultural offices abroad are legally and technically not embassies. These posts, however, are deemed to be the functional equivalent in terms of practice. Through such informal diplomacy, Taipei has been relatively effective in sending diplomatic missions and staff members to Manila. The diplomatic treatment accorded to Taiwanese economic and cultural offices and envoys has positioned the ROC to actively engage with the Philippines without necessarily contravening the one-China policy.

Taipei’s initiatives have been largely effective in building a positive image of Taiwan among Filipinos. While China’s soft power in the Philippines is more extensive due to its larger economic footprint, Beijing is often viewed with suspicion due to the political and strategic motivations behind its actions, particularly in its approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Soft-Power Resources in the Philippines: Education, Labor Policy, and Tourism

In the absence of formal diplomatic relations, Taiwan’s approach to soft power in the Philippines rests on three pillars: education, foreign labor policy, and tourism.

Education has long been a strategic tool in Taiwan-Philippines relations, beginning with Taiwan’s influence over Chinese schools in the Philippines from the 1950s to 1960s.[1] Today, Taiwan offers generous scholarship programs such as the Taiwan Scholarship and Huayu Enrichment Scholarship, enabling Filipino students to study at Taiwanese universities in key areas like technology, business, and international relations. These programs foster goodwill and long-term positive perceptions of Taiwan in the Philippines when students return home.

Foreign labor policy has also been utilized by the ROC to boost its relationship with the Philippines. As of 2023, about 170,000 Filipino migrant workers are employed in Taiwan, primarily in the electronics and technology sectors.[2] Taiwan has also invested in skills training and human resource development in partnership with Philippine institutions. This labor integration not only supports Taiwanese industries but also enhances mutual trust and socioeconomic ties.

Finally, tourism has proved to be a major driver of economic activity between the two countries in recent years, deepening cross-cultural engagements. Visa-free entry and aggressive outreach by the ROC Tourism Administration have led to a significant rise in Filipino visitors, peaking at over 500,000 arrivals in 2019. Conversely, 331,792 Taiwanese arrivals were recorded in the same year.[3] These exchanges strengthen Taiwan’s image in the Philippines as a democratic, open, and accessible society. Moreover, tourism has become an effective soft-power resource for more intimate people-to-people exchanges in the face of aggressive actions by the PRC.

The New Southbound Policy and NSP+

Launched under President Tsai Ing-wen, the New Southbound Policy (NSP) represents Taiwan’s strategic pivot toward Southeast Asia, aiming to reduce economic dependence on China while enhancing cooperation in education, technology, agriculture, and healthcare. Tsai’s successor, President Lai Ching-te, is expanding the policy through NSP+, which introduces six strategic “corridors.” Three of these corridors are led by the government (technology, health, and resilience), and three are driven by civil society (think tanks, NGOs, and youth engagement).[4] This evolution of the NSP positions Taiwan as a regional hub for democratic partnerships and cultural cooperation.

As the Lai government promotes Taiwan’s values, culture, and ideas under the NSP+, it could be more strategic in creating a roadmap for the relationship. Specifically, it could emphasize popular culture, historical and political values, local cuisine, and other features to better distinguish the general image of Taiwan from that of the mainland China. Such efforts to strengthen the fabric of Taiwan’s soft power could promote sustainable cooperation and trust-building with the Philippines.[5]

Business and NGO Engagement

Strong people-to-people exchanges in trade and investment circumvent Taiwan’s lack of formal diplomatic relations with the Philippines by facilitating more government-to-government interactions. Investments from Taiwan-based companies in the Philippines have also gained positive results. Taiwanese companies have prioritized the recruitment of employees under the NSP. Business trends now show that investors are more likely to continue with their massive investments in the Philippines.

The aggressive promotion by the Philippines of its Comprehensive National Industrial Strategy and Manufacturing Revitalization Plan has complemented Taiwan’s NSP. As a result, the bilateral trade relationship between the two countries is expected to create a more advantageous environment for the interests of their peoples. Both initiatives are enhancing Taiwan-Philippines economic diplomacy, leading to greater investment and technology transfer from Taiwan to the Philippines.

Filipino migrant workers are among the active workforce in Taiwan’s manufacturing and technology sectors. Given this bond, NGOs focused on migrant policy are actively providing language training on managerial knowledge for transnational workers in Taiwan. Such training for industrial talent has become mutually beneficial for both Taiwan and the Philippines. Filipinos who completed the course can return to the Philippines and start a business or work with Taiwanese businesses.

Conclusion: Toward Sustainable Cooperation

The outcome of the May 12 midterm election in the Philippines marked an interesting point for how Manila will balance its national pride with practical socioeconomic realities that could lead to even closer informal ties with Taiwan and a recalibration of the Philippines’ relationship with China. A survey conducted before the election found that 75% of Filipinos would reject pro-China candidates and favor those who maintain an assertive stance in defense of the national sovereignty.[6] However, as voters generally prioritize domestic issues, several Duterte-backed candidates have secured senatorial seats due to their stances on Philippine public safety, social services, and the economy. These candidates also seem to have benefited from the former president’s enduring popularity that was magnified by his daughter Sara Duterte, who is vice president, and his own arrest by the International Criminal Court during the recent campaign period.

Despite its progress in strengthening economic, cultural, and educational bonds with the Philippines, Taiwan faces challenges due to Beijing’s strong regional influence and the international recognition of the one-China policy. China has increasingly tied its economy with the rest of the world, especially with Southeast Asia, and any development in the Chinese economy—whether beneficial or detrimental—has direct implications for the region. In particular, Beijing is heavily promoting its Belt and Road Initiative. It is also expanding its sphere of influence through the network of Confucius Institutes, which has become an avenue for exporting China’s cultural values to the Philippines.[7]

Taiwan’s attempts to build a stronger regional presence are thus facing resistance. Nonetheless, its soft power—anchored in education, labor, and tourism—has yielded tangible benefits in the Philippines even in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. In particular, the NSP and its successor, the NSP+, have positioned Taiwan to offer promising opportunities for deeper cooperation. Outside of educational and cultural exchanges, Taiwan and the Philippines have reinforced the strength of their relationship during times of crisis—most recently during the Covid-19 pandemic. In the early months of the pandemic, for example, Taiwan was among the first countries that donated surgical masks and protective gowns to the Philippines as part of the “Taiwan can help” campaign.

Beyond these positive gains from relationship-building efforts, Taiwan still could be more strategic in tightening its bonds with the Philippines. To this end, the ROC must continue to refine its soft-power strategy through NPS+ to remain relevant in an evolving geopolitical landscape by effectively mobilizing its public and private resources. This includes integrating academic, business, and civil society networks to weave more tightly its existing cultural and economic fabric in the Philippines.

Reymund B. Flores is a Professor of Politics and Governance in the Department of Social Sciences at West Visayas State University (Philippines). He also serves as the editor-in-chief of the Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal. His research interests and academic works revolve around Asian politics and strategic relations, development policy, collaborative governance, state-civil society engagements, and risk/crisis communication.

Note: This commentary is related to the author’s earlier work titled “Navigating the China Factor in Taiwan’s Soft Power Diffusion in the Philippines,” published as a chapter in Karl Chee Leong Lee and Ying-kit Chan, ed., Taiwan and Southeast Asia: Soft Power and Hard Truths Facing China’s Ascendancy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2023).

Endnotes

[1] Ellen H. Palanca, “A Comparative Study of Chinese Education in the Philippines and Malaysia,” Asian Studies: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia 38, no. 2 (2002): 40.

[2] Joshua Bernard España, “Evolving, Not Evading: The Philippines’ National Security Policy and Its Strategic Calculus in Taiwan,” Global Taiwan Institute, Global Taiwan Brief, October 4, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/10/evolving-not-evading-the-philippines-national-security-policy-and-its-strategic-calculus-in-taiwan.

[3] Czeriza Valencia, “Pinoy Workers Power Taiwan’s Tech Industry,” Philippine Star, April 28, 2019, https://www.philstar.com/business/2019/04/28/1913088/ pinoy-workers-power-taiwans-tech-industry.

[4] Patrick Kurniawan, “What to Know about Lai’s NSP+,” Taipei Times, March 27, 2025, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2025/03/27/2003834121.

[5] Bernardo M. Villegas, “The Philippine economy in 2025: Look to Taiwan,” BusinessWorld, February 26, 2025, https://www.bworldonline.com/opinion/2025/02/26/655475/the-philippine-economy-in-2025-look-to-taiwan.

[6] Janvic Mateo, “SWS: 75% Back Bets Asserting Phl Sovereignty,” OneNews, April 29, 2025, https://www.onenews.ph/articles/sws-75-back-bets-asserting-phl-sovereignty#google_vignette.

[7] Reymund B. Flores and Rachel Mary Anne A. Basas, “Chinese-Taiwanese-Southeast Asian Triangular Relations: On Building and Rebuilding Political and Economic Assertiveness in South China Sea,” Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations 4, no. 3 (2018): 915.