Conclusion: Spearheading a Pathway for U.S. Presence in Melanesia

The United States often refers to itself as a “Pacific nation” as a means of establishing commonality with the Pacific Islands. There is accuracy to this self-characterization, given the extensive history of U.S. military and diplomatic activity in the region since World War II. However, for many Pacific Islanders observing and interpreting U.S. presence, the heavy emphasis on geopolitics overshadows the significance of forming and sustaining Pacific relationships based on cultural and ideological understanding, as well as historical awareness of the legacy of Western colonization. Concerns about geopolitics and strategic competition, particularly in the subregion of Melanesia, have been amplified as China’s rising influence generated reactionary responses by the United States to gain strategic advantage. As was continuously highlighted during the NBR-sponsored Track 1.5 Pacific Islands Strategic Dialogue in Fiji, Melanesian countries are not interested in choosing sides and are concerned with the region becoming a contentious environment for strategic competition. The “friends to all, enemies to none” principle, which guides Melanesian foreign policy and acts as a mechanism for navigating geopolitical strife, could be threatened as this competition continues to intensify.[1] It is critical that the United States and other foreign powers operating in the region acknowledge this policy as a fundamental component of Melanesia’s political identity.

The essays in this report have identified a series of issues across the Melanesian landscape for the United States to be aware of when making policy decisions. Specifically, domestic development challenges, nation-state agency, differing perspectives on China, and Pacific Islands centrality, among others, are issues of importance to Melanesian scholars and practitioners, who conveyed this message to their U.S. counterparts over the course of the Pacific Islands Strategic Dialogue organized by the National Bureau of Asian Research in April 2023. Simultaneously, diversity across the South Pacific, and even within the subregion of Melanesia, requires the United States to establish a nuanced approach toward engagement with the region and the countries within it. At the dialogue, which informed the contributions to this report, U.S.-China competition and Melanesian strategic autonomy emerged as top security concerns for countries within the subregion.

Regional Perspectives and Realities

Melanesia has evolved into a contentious theater for U.S.-China competition within the Indo-Pacific region, as China’s diplomatic, political, economic, and military presence is perceived as threatening U.S. interests.[2] U.S. concerns have triggered increased U.S. government attention on engagement with Pacific Island countries, including the opening of embassies in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.[3] The U.S. government has also re-established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Fiji and elevated USAID presence in Papua New Guinea (PNG) to a country representative office.[4] While these signals of the United States’ commitment are welcome, Pacific Island leaders have expressed concerns that U.S. behavior triggered by competition with China will distract from efforts by the Pacific Islands Forum “to address its existing security priorities.”[5] These priorities include addressing climate security, prioritizing human security, and monitoring illegal activities. As the United States continues to increase its activities in Melanesia, a comprehensive understanding of regional perspectives and priorities is critical for effective diplomacy and policy implementation.

Each Melanesian nation faces unique and varying internal security challenges. From ethnic-based conflict in PNG and political instability in Solomon Islands to development challenges across Fiji, each country faces unique challenges.[6] Ilan Kiloe’s essay highlights how experiences of internal conflict served as the foundation for the establishment of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The MSG still serves as a major platform for collective action to address security concerns among member nations, but it does not necessarily have the capacity to address internal issues. Kiloe argues that successful partnerships require external actors that are able to develop a deeper understanding of Melanesian customs and diplomatic practices. While multinational organizations such as the MSG provide a platform for broader Melanesian engagement, external actors must also learn about each individual nation’s domestic environment when considering how to engage.

Over the course of the strategic dialogue, Melanesian scholars and practitioners stressed that while each nation faces unique internal security challenges, nation-building and the establishment of political institutions amid decolonization are shared challenges across all countries. Patrick Kaiku and Vernon Gawi address weak institutional governance in PNG and a political culture that does not prioritize international affairs discourse to explain how those factors can, at times, lead to disjointed policy priorities between decision-makers and constituents in PNG. In the face of U.S.-China competition, Kaiku and Gawi suggest addressing internal challenges through several mechanisms, including the development of international relations and foreign affairs academic programs in Melanesian educational institutions, the promotion of early-career opportunities in the field of foreign policy, and student exchange programs in collaboration with foreign universities.

Focusing on Solomon Islands, Anna Powles describes how strategic competition offers benefits to individual countries and also generates unintended consequences. For example, Melanesian countries have welcomed security cooperation to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, but intensified strategic competition could overwhelm regional peace and security efforts. In Solomon Islands, specifically, the need for security assistance has resulted primarily in policing agreements. Yet, while the government has requested and agreed to these arrangements, external involvement in policing could exacerbate local security dynamics and increase societal tensions, thereby generating future potential flashpoints. Even if policy agreements do not exacerbate domestic tension, Solomon Islands has limited absorptive capacity and needs to be clear about which agreements help the country best meet its long-term goals.

In contrast with the focus on internal security challenges highlighted by previous authors, William Waqavakatoga explores the utilization of narratives by Pacific Island countries to assert their agency amid an influx of engagements with external actors. Highlighting the importance of these narratives, especially in light of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, he echoes the need for external actors to align with regional perspectives rather than solely react to China. Critical steps for the United States include rebuilding trust in its relationships and aligning its climate change policies with Pacific narratives. Waqavakatoga also suggests how religion could be utilized as a diplomatic bridge between the United States and Pacific Island leaders. Overall, he stresses the importance of cultural and historical understanding in shaping foreign policy in the Pacific region, urging global powers to engage meaningfully with Pacific Island narratives and identities.

The State of U.S. Presence in Melanesia

In September 2022 the United States unveiled the Pacific Partnership Strategy, which is a roadmap for addressing regional priorities identified by Pacific Island nation leaders.[7] Regional leaders have expressed a desire to engage with the United States outside the realm of competition with China,[8] and this sentiment was repeatedly highlighted by Melanesian participants during the dialogue. Pacific Island leaders are reluctant to involve themselves in U.S.-China competition due to the “friends to all, enemies to none” principle; instead, each country welcomes relations with both the United States and China. Acknowledging these values provides the United States the opportunity to shift its narratives and develop a deeper understanding of the South Pacific region and a more nuanced approach to Melanesian engagement.

Focusing on engagement with Melanesia, Yan Bennett’s essay argues that U.S. foreign policy rhetoric may need to “right-size” the rhetoric on China to better adjust U.S. strategic messaging. China’s intentions have historically been diplomatic and economic, and while the country’s engagement has increasingly included security cooperation, these activities do not preclude the United States from achieving its foreign policy objectives. Bennett further articulates how the reframing of U.S. perceptions of China could coincide with the prioritization of U.S. diplomatic engagement via existing public programming in areas such as sustainable development and democratic resilience. Relying on already existing U.S. programs is a means to both restore Melanesian countries’ faith in U.S. engagement and establish a foundation for sustained partnership.

While acknowledging that China’s engagement with the region is “not inherently problematic,” Margaret Sparling argues that recent Chinese engagement in areas of media relations, foreign policy, and the maritime domain could constrain regional autonomy or threaten democratic stability. To counter such activities, she suggests that U.S. engagement with Melanesian countries focus on building partnerships, investing in educational programming and local media, and expanding economic connectivity, such as through compatible information and communications technology systems. U.S. policymakers could learn from some aspects of China’s engagement in the region by shifting approaches from security-centric cooperation to economic and diplomatic initiatives. The United States could differentiate itself from China through democratic-based values and the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Policy Options

In terms of narratives, Pacific Island nations are not small, weak, isolated, or lacking in agency. The Blue Pacific narrative expressly counters these “disempowering narratives” by emphasizing alternative perspectives, regionalism, and collective action. It is incumbent on U.S. policymakers to understand Melanesian narratives without appropriating them. U.S. policy toward the Pacific should certainly be informed by regional narratives and acknowledge and appreciate them where appropriate. However, as the report from NBR’s first Pacific Islands Strategic Dialogue in May 2022 noted, “appreciating the concerns of Pacific Island country leaders is not simply agreeing with them or using their rhetoric.”[9] One recent academic analysis shows how the Blue Pacific narrative serves as a way for “less materially powerful states” to influence external actors, but warns that there is also a danger that “strategic narratives may be appropriated by their target(s).”[10] To avoid appropriation, while encouraging acknowledgment, the United States must actively coordinate with Pacific Island leaders in advance of major policy announcements. Doing so may require strategic patience from U.S. policymakers. But remaining committed to Pacific regionalism, which is conveyed as a central tenet of the Pacific Partnership Strategy, means effectively coordinating with the Pacific Islands Forum and consulting with regional countries to ensure policy alignment. Policy announcements should be delayed until proper consultation has occurred with the relevant Pacific partners.

Department of Defense resources, which remain the vast majority available for carrying out U.S. foreign policy, should be used to increase the capacity of the Partners in the Blue Pacific. However, those activities also need to be more effectively coordinated with Pacific regional organizations and individual countries. On several occasions in recent years, the announcement of a major diplomatic program came as a surprise to citizens, residents, and governments that likely should have been consulted. The Partners in the Blue Pacific could become a force multiplier and a coordination tool for external countries. Yet, if activities are not coordinated with Pacific Island and Melanesian partner nations, those programs will fail. Moreover, if the Partners in the Blue Pacific becomes more about external powers talking to one another without regard for the region’s interests, allegations of appropriation will have merit. The Partners in the Blue Pacific coordination mechanism could be useful if it is systematic and builds on the experience of local partners. But that will take presence, time, effort, consultation, and a long-term commitment to engagement with Melanesia and the broader Pacific Islands region.

In conclusion, NBR’s Pacific Islands Strategic Dialogue found that the diverse and unique challenges facing Melanesian nations require engagement by the United States. The U.S. government will also need to respect each Melanesian nation’s autonomy while pursuing mutually beneficial actions. As described in the 2023 report from this dialogue series, Pacific Island countries are not monolithic, and Melanesian perspectives should not be haphazardly lumped together when considering policy decisions. U.S. policymakers will need to tailor engagement plans and consider areas where bilateral agreements may be more appropriate than a broader regional approach. To better understand Melanesian perspectives, U.S. policymakers must recognize that Melanesian countries view China as a development partner and would like to avoid entanglement in U.S. strategic competition with China. If U.S. engagement is centered solely on China, the message may not resonate with Melanesian leaders and thus could compromise prospects for productive and mutually beneficial partnerships. Finally, in recognition of Pacific Island perspectives and agency, proactive inclusion of Melanesian leaders at the early stages of U.S. Indo-Pacific planning and policymaking will reassure those partners of the United States’ role as a collaborative partner rather than a potential threat to Melanesian strategic autonomy.

Miles Monaco is a Project Manager with the Political and Security Affairs group at the National Bureau of Asian Research.

Darlene Onuorah is a former Project Associate with the Political and Security Affairs group at the National Bureau of Asian Research.

Endnotes

[1] For further discussion, see the first report from this project: April A. Herlevi, ed., “Charting a New Course for the Pacific Islands: Strategic Pathways for U.S.-Micronesia Engagement,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, March 2023, https://www.nbr.org/publication/charting-a-new-course-for-the-pacific-islands-strategic-pathways-for-u-s-micronesia-engagement.

[2] White House, Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C., September 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Pacific-Partnership-Strategy.pdf.

[3] “Enhancing the U.S.-Pacific Islands Partnership,” White House, Fact Sheet, September 25, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/25/fact-sheet-enhancing-the-u-s-pacific-islands-partnership.

[4] Craig Hart, “Renewed U.S. Engagement in the Pacific: Assessing the Importance of the Pacific Islands,” testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 23, 2023, available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/mar-23-2023-renewed-us-engagement-pacific-assessing-importance-pacific-islands.

[5] Pacific Islands Forum, “Pacific Security Outlook Report 2022–2023,” 2022, https://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Pacific-Security-Outlook-Report-2022-2023.pdf.

[6] For background on the conflict in PNG, see Ronald May “Papua New Guinea: Issues of External and Internal Security,” Security Challenges 8, no. 4 (2012): 47–60.

[7] White House, Pacific Partnership Strategy of the United States.

[8] Gordon Peake, “Six Months In: Where Does U.S.-Pacific Islands Strategy Stand?” United States Institute of Peace, April 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/six-months-where-does-us-pacific-islands-strategy-stand.

[9] Herlevi, “Charting a New Course for the Pacific Islands.”

[10] Joanne Wallis, Maima Koro, and Corey O’Dwyer, “The ‘Blue Pacific’ Strategic Narrative: Rhetorical Action, Acceptance, Entrapment, and Appropriation?” Pacific Review 37, no. 4 (2024): 797–824.