Ending the MFN Battle
The MFN debate has been the poorest imaginable way to make coherent policy or to be credible to Beijing. An entirely new process is required that will involve Congress more intimately and constructively in China policy and that will be more effective with the Chinese.
The annual debate over normal (most-favored-nation, or MFN) tariff treatment for China has become the principal, fruitless vehicle by which Congress and the President engage in dialogue about China policy. This process has produced virtually no discernible change in Beijing’s policies and has weakened the elite and popular base of those in China most inclined toward genuine reform; it has locked successive administrations and Congress in unproductive debate annually for eight years; it has encouraged presidents to make commitments they cannot keep (such as Bill Clinton’s 1993 pledge to link MFN to human rights in China); and all this has made U.S. administrations look impotent to Beijing and dangerously unpredictable to allies and friends in the region and throughout the world. In short, the MFN debate has been the poorest imaginable way to make coherent policy or to be credible to Beijing.
An entirely new process is required that will involve Congress more intimately and constructively in China policy and that will be more effective with the Chinese. If properly managed, granting permanent MFN status in the context of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) can have results relevant to human rights and American economic interests, get the MFN debate monkey off our backs, and end the pointless argument about whether Americans care more about trade or human rights. They care about both, and under the right circumstances these objectives can be mutually reinforcing.