Japan's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Shaping Indo-Pacific Security

How does Japan view the Russia-Ukraine war, and why do you think Japan seems to be taking a more leading role in supporting Ukraine?

Japan has a long and difficult history with Russia. In 1945, Russia occupied several islands northeast of Hokkaido (the so-called Northern Territories), evicting the longtime Japanese residents and settling Russians. This territorial dispute dominated Russo-Japanese relations from the end of World War II until the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The two sides have never signed a formal peace treaty, and both Japanese elite and public opinion have been highly negative toward the Soviet Union and Russia, seeing them as untrustworthy, militarist, and expansionist.

Former prime minister Abe Shinzo spent much political capital attempting to improve relations and sign a peace treaty. The geostrategic logic was China-focused: if Russo-Japanese relations were developed, Sino-Russian relations would weaken. Despite Abe offering economic and territorial concessions and meeting Vladamir Putin over 25 times, the policy failed.

As part of this diplomatic push, Japan gave Russia a pass following its 2014 annexation of Crimea. This helps make clear that Ukraine is not really the issue at stake. What matters to Japan is the impact of the invasion on the global norms against territorial conquest and specifically how the violation of these norms could increase the likelihood of Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Prime Minister Kishida Fumio put it very clearly in 2022: “Ukraine today might be the East Asia of tomorrow.” Basically, Japan is seeking to deter China.

Has Japan’s response to the conflict led to enhanced alliances and minilateral arrangements among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and if so in what ways?

Japan’s security elite sees China as an existential threat. If China annexes Taiwan, the resulting conflict could escalate to the level of a regional or global war. Even if it does not, Chinese control over Taiwan dramatically weakens Japan’s security situation.

The failure to prevent the invasion of Ukraine is seen as a failure of deterrence. Therefore, Japan has sought to bolster deterrence not only through acquiring new military capabilities but also by deepening the alliance with the United States, developing new and existing partnerships, and generally demonstrating its resolve.

However, U.S. political instability and increasing isolationist sentiment have raised fears that the United States is an unreliable partner. Thus, Japan has been diversifying partners since before the invasion, under the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision. This vision—or, rather, strategy—is aimed at developing security ties with states that share fears of Chinese regional hegemony: India, Australia, and certain ASEAN states, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. Despite India’s closeness to Russia, the Quad (India, Australia, Japan, and the United States) has taken center stage. Japan and Australia, in particular, share the same regional security outlook, and their long-standing quasi-alliance seems to be evolving into a virtual alliance.

Most recently, Japan and South Korea have normalized bilateral security relations after several years of a deep freeze. Given the fractious nature of relations between the two countries, however, it is difficult to say what this means and whether it will last.

Overall, Japan is seeking to diversify regional partners under the framework of the alliance with the United States, while also hedging against U.S. retrenchment.

What are Japan’s most significant direct or indirect contributions to supporting Ukraine, whether through arms sales, international leadership, or commitments to potential post-conflict reconstruction?

While Japan was a laggard in implementing sanctions after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it did not hesitate to do so following the invasion of Ukraine. This included financial sanctions, blacklists of individuals and organizations, and trade restrictions not only on Russia and Russian firms but on firms in China, India, and other countries that are seen as supporting Russia’s invasion. As the European Union has done, Japan has reduced imports of Russian hydrocarbons. It has also sent humanitarian supplies to Ukraine, such as medicine, generators, food, and military supplies, ranging from bulletproof vests to surveillance drones. Further, Japan bypassed domestic restrictions on arms exports by sending Patriot missiles (for missile defense) to the United States, so that the United States could continue to supply Ukraine. In total, Japan has pledged over $12 billion.

Japan has also deepened its relations with the EU and NATO. Kishida participated in several NATO summits, with Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg describing Japan as NATO’s closest ally. Though symbolically meaningful, NATO-Japan security cooperation has obvious limits. Japan’s primary concern is China, whereas NATO fears Russian expansionism. However, making East Asian security an issue for NATO is part of Japan’s deterrence strategy of increasing the risk of a tougher European economic response to Chinese aggression toward Taiwan.
Again, Japan’s response to Ukraine should be understood through the prism of East Asian security rather than the realities of the invasion itself.

How might the recent mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea lead to potential consequences for Japan, and was Japan’s strong support of Ukraine a factor in this development?

North Korea has long been Japan’s bogeyman. The Kim regime is seen as an evil and brutal dictatorship that periodically threatens Japan with nuclear annihilation. Its missile tests routinely fly over the Japanese main islands, triggering alarms in various localities. Historically it has abducted Japanese citizens from the Sea of Japan and brought them to North Korea to serve as translators, teachers, and other professionals.

Given North Korea’s pariah status, even China has maintained a distance. China continues to prop up the Kim regime economically while understanding that military aid would seriously harm relations with both South Korea and Japan and destabilize the region.

The fact that Russia has pledged to help North Korea’s missile program, which is overwhelmingly Japan’s main concern, shocked Tokyo. As for Russian motivations, it is hard to say that the mutual defense pact was aimed at Japan. The basic quid pro quo was aid in exchange for shells and missiles. Replenishing supplies was Russia’s goal. Even if Japan had not reacted to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia would have acted in its own interest. Moscow does not have a history of taking Japanese interests into consideration, to put it mildly. Having said that, the fallout likely pleased Russia, given that it generally seeks to sow instability and chaos among its rivals.

With no foreseeable end to the fighting in Ukraine, and given the potential for escalation, what types of changes do you expect to see Japan make in terms of its support for Ukraine and its own defense and military policies?

Unlike its Western partners, there is little domestic opposition to Japan’s response. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been in power almost uninterrupted since 1955, and continuously since 2012. It has no peer competitors, at least for the moment. Moreover, there is minimal foreign and security policy debate in Japan. Given that its response to the invasion is essentially aimed at deterring China, and that China is seen as an essential threat by the security elite, Japan is likely to continue its support for Ukraine. It will continue developing its own capabilities and deepening regional partnerships for the foreseeable future.

That is not to say that Japan can do anything it wants. The ambitious plans outlined by the Kishida administration were constrained by fiscal and demographic factors. Japan is entering a period of accelerating demographic decline, with associated increases in spending on health and welfare. The Japan Self-Defense Forces continually fail to meet recruitment targets. Faced with a contracting economy and an aging population, the question is less about Japan’s resolution and more one of capacity.

Paul O’Shea is an Associate Professor in the Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies at Lund University in Sweden.

This interview was conducted by Claudia Jacobo while an intern with the Political and Security Affairs group at NBR.