Squaring the Triangle: An Australian Perspective on Asian Security Minilateralism

Squaring the Triangle
An Australian Perspective on Asian Security Minilateralism

by Rory Medcalf
December 1, 2008

This essay examines the criteria Australia uses in deciding whether to pursue minilateral security dialogue arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, applied to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) and the short-lived quadrilateral dialogue.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This essay examines the criteria Australia uses in deciding whether to pursue minilateral security dialogue arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, applied to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) and the short-lived quadrilateral dialogue.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Australia’s deepening role in the TSD with the U.S. and Japan, and its flirtation with a quadrilateral dialogue involving India, can be explained according to a set of national-interest criteria that include, but go beyond, a soft balancing of Chinese influence. These include a wish to help socialize Japan as an active regional security provider, an imperative to keep U.S. attention focused on the region, and a concern to ensure a continued major place for Australia in the system of U.S. alliances and partnerships.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
  • Australia will benefit from sustaining and deepening the TSD, while using its new strategic dialogue with China to help moderate any Chinese perceptions of the TSD as a threat.
  • The experiment of the quadrilateral dialogue suggests that Asia-Pacific countries should make a greater effort to identify areas for security dialogue and cooperation where shared values are not a prerequisite for progress.
  • At the same time, Australia cannot assume that its distancing itself from the quadrilateral dialogue will end the trend of connecting the spokes among U.S. allies and partners: Canberra will need to be mindful of potentially being excluded from a continuation of that process, for instance through growing Japan-India ties.