The Long Tweet: Achieving Integrated Deterrence through Integrated Assurance in the Indo-Pacific

The last time the United States faced a rival superpower that possessed the capability to rewrite the global security order, a young American diplomat in Moscow sent a telegram to his superiors that informed his country’s approach to this strategic rivalry. George Kennan’s “long telegram,” sent in 1946 amid increasing Soviet bellicosity, still resonates today. Describing a state that focused all of its efforts to “advance [the] relative strength of USSR as [a] factor in international society,” Kennan detailed a Soviet government motivated by “an instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.”[1] This regime pursued policies devoted to increasing the prestige and standing of the Soviet state through “maximum development of armed forces,” extending influence into strategic terrain beyond its borders and undermining international conventions and organizations that did not serve its purposes. Likewise, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has built the largest navy in the world, rapidly expanded its air and missile forces, built up its nuclear arsenal, and increased its cyber and information warfare capabilities. China’s expansive and unlawful claims of territory and natural resources, as well as bellicose behavior along its land and maritime borders, exemplify a state determined to establish regional dominance and global influence.

In his dispatch to Washington, Kennan prescribes an approach to Soviet antagonism now recognizable as classic deterrence: “if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so…. [T]hus, [Soviet] success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness, and vigor which [the] Western World can muster.” Likewise, the U.S. government has adopted a deterrent policy to preventing armed conflict with China. The 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy articulates three approaches: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages. The strategic aim in confronting an aggressive PRC remains the same as it was 80 years ago in confronting the Soviet Union—avert an armed conflict that would be catastrophic for the world. However, these historic parallels between the early Cold War and the 21st century begin to break down when overlaid on the complex physical and political geography of the Indo-Pacific region. U.S.-China competition takes place in a region of vast ocean distances and noncontiguous land masses that lacks a NATO-like mutual defense alliance.

In the early days of the Cold War, the “long telegram” provided a starting point for U.S. policymakers to understand the Soviet Union’s strategic goals and how to deter them. Today, a “long tweet” to U.S. policymakers must distill the idea of integrated deterrence into a vision of integrated assurance, with tangible demonstrations of the United States’ commitment to its allies and partners.

China’s Strategic Outlook

In China’s quest for rejuvenation, the respect of the international community stands as the supreme objective. The PRC and its governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are driven by a desire to restore their nation to its rightful place as a global power, one that it occupied prior to the so-called “century of humiliation” from 1839 to 1949. This period, in the eyes of the CCP, saw China reduced from a dominant state at the center of a regional tributary system to a submissive nation carved to pieces at the hands of colonial powers. As mainland China emerged from the chaos of World War II and the Chinese Civil War, this narrative solidified in the minds of CCP leaders. Even today, the CCP’s view of the PRC as the disadvantaged party persists. China’s military modernization and increased assertiveness on the international stage under Xi Jinping’s leadership are aimed at transforming China into a global power respected for its strength. “Mao Zedong made Chinese people stand up; Deng Xiaoping made Chinese people rich; Xi Jinping will make Chinese people strong,” proclaimed the CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily in October 2014.[2] The PRC’s strategic perspective today echoes, in many respects, the Soviet Union’s perception of “antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’” described by Kennan.

The most likely (and dangerous) scenario in which the CCP provokes armed conflict is a forceful reunification with Taiwan. Reunification remains an explicit and essential aim of the CCP. The PRC’s increasingly militant behavior along its maritime borders in the South China Sea and its land border with India also raise concerns about the possibility of armed conflict. However, events such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have complicated China’s strategic calculus. China’s desire to project strength and garner the respect of the international community means it must tread carefully in realizing its territorial ambitions, with the consensus being that the PRC will not start a war unless it is certain of victory.[3] Chinese leaders and scholars have studied the Russian military’s poor initial performance, the ferocity of Ukraine’s resistance, and the international reaction for clues to inform their own actions toward Taiwan.

The largest strategic uncertainty in China’s calculation concerning an invasion of Taiwan—or any armed territorial expansion—is whether and how the United States and the international community would respond. To support an overarching aim of deterrence, the U.S. military’s operational forces must complicate the Chinese calculus by continually assuring U.S. partners and allies of the United States’ commitment. As the U.S. Army’s operational headquarters in the Indo-Pacific region, I Corps provides this integrated assurance through visible posture of forces, responsive protection of critical locations, and reliable logistical sustainment.

Posture

When U.S. partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific weigh the capabilities of the United States military to respond to a conflict, the immutable factor of distance is foremost on their minds. China’s large military force and quantity of long-range munitions, combined with short distances to potential conflict zones, give them an advantage over a U.S. military that must project force over a much longer distance. While the United States maintains permanent military bases in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), permanent basing in the territory of other regional partners—even treaty allies such as the Philippines and Thailand—remains politically sensitive and largely infeasible. In the absence of permanent basing and standing military headquarters, posturing effectively in the region requires creative and consistent engagement. Persistent rotational presence sends strong signals to countries in the region that the United States is a committed and supportive partner. As the operational headquarters and single-largest supplier of U.S. Army forces in the region, I Corps has taken the lead in maintaining a visible, forward-deployed posture on a rotational basis.

While providing trained and ready forces, I Corps maintains consistent and personal relationships to facilitate the deployment of U.S. forces forward and to maximize their effectiveness in the region. These enduring relationships assure allies and partners by establishing continuity, improving tactical interoperability, and enabling the interpersonal relationships that are critical in many Indo-Pacific cultures. I Corps and its subordinate units provide the on-the-ground presence that assures friendly nations in a tangible way. For example, I Corps routinely partners with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s Ground Component Command for multinational exercises, as it would fill the role of an operational command headquarters in crisis or conflict. Consistent and personal engagement drives tactical interoperability between U.S. and Japanese commanders and staffs as they operate side by side in command posts and training grounds to develop shared operating procedures. I Corps maintains similar partnerships with headquarters in the Australian Army, Royal Thai Army, ROK Army, and others throughout the region.

This approach permeates through I Corps’ subordinate units that establish enduring relationships with friendly militaries operating in similar environments or exercising similar capabilities. The 7th Infantry Division and its motorized Stryker brigade combat teams maintain a close relationship with the Royal Thai Army’s motorized Stryker regiments. Similarly, the 25th Infantry Division maintains habitual relationships with light, jungle-fighting infantry units in the Philippines and Indonesia. Through frequent combined training, commanders develop interpersonal relationships, shared tactics, and a familiarity with the region that reassures a critical ally of the United States’ commitment. Building interoperability and shared readiness in peacetime is a responsibility unique to I Corps and its divisions, and a critical component of integrated assurance.

Protection

The vast distances and dispersed land masses of the region, along with China’s long-range missile and cyberwarfare capabilities, mean that U.S. forces deployed in the Indo-Pacific are subject to attack or disruption by a variety of means. I Corps maintains its effective deterrent posture in the Indo-Pacific by ensuring that forces deployed are survivable and resilient, enabling them to operate effectively while minimizing their vulnerability to attack or exploitation. However, while many Indo-Pacific countries have concerns about their security in the face of China’s aggression, those concerns often coexist with fears that an increased U.S. military posture in the region will provoke the PRC and drag countries hosting U.S. forces into an armed conflict. Integrated assurance, therefore, requires that the U.S. military take its own force protection seriously while addressing the protection concerns of its allies and partners. These shared concerns about force protection range from air and missile defense to critical infrastructure and digital network security.

I Corps ensures that its deployed forces and those of its allies and partners are protected by employing four protection principles: understanding the environment, understanding the operational plan, integrating protection planning into the operations process, and implementing a protection plan that spans from a unit’s home station to its forward-operating location. Applying the first three of these principles effectively not only requires close integration with allies and partners but reassures them by addressing their own concerns about the risks they incur in operating alongside U.S. forces.

Understanding the environment in the Indo-Pacific goes beyond studying a map and noting the physical locations that U.S. forces must protect against an attack. Truly proactive and responsive force protection means working closely with allies and partners to comprehend an often complex human and political environment, understand the host nation’s concerns about force protection, and integrate them into a multinational force-protection plan.

I Corps’ posture and relationships enable it to assure Indo-Pacific partners and allies by planning and rehearsing critical force-protection tasks—many of them tied to real-world threats—during multinational exercises in the region. These exercises improve the ability of I Corps and partner headquarters to plan together, identify gaps in force-protection capabilities and authorities, and develop methods for addressing deficiencies. This integrated, multinational planning creates a shared vision of how the United States will work with allies and partners to protect military forces and critical infrastructure in the region, tangibly demonstrating and reassuring friendly nations of its commitment. With many governments and the populations of many friendly countries in the Indo-Pacific region expressing concern that close military cooperation with the United States will leave them vulnerable to targeting by the PRC or other aggressive regimes, it is critical to assure allies and partners that U.S. military presence represents increased protection, not increased vulnerability.

Sustainment

Forward posture and protection efforts only provide effective assurance if applied over extended periods of time. As such, logistical sustainment of U.S. forces rotating through the region becomes critical to their credibility. Allies and partners are less likely to be reassured of the U.S. commitment without a significant, tangible effort to overcome the challenges of sustaining forces in this vast, noncontiguous region. I Corps sustains its forces in the Indo-Pacific theater through forward posturing of logistical assets while exercising precision, joint, and multinational sustainment functions alongside allies and partners. These efforts, taken ahead of a crisis or conflict, tangibly demonstrate to allies and partners in the region that U.S. forces have the capability and capacity to sustain multinational security operations over the long term.

Forward posturing of sustainment assets in friendly countries assures these allies and partners that the U.S. military will be ready to support them immediately when called on. The forward positioning of dispersed and thoughtfully configured contingency stocks will accelerate the timeline for U.S. forces to commence operations. Pre-positioned stockpiles of supplies demonstrate a tangible commitment to shared security concerns and address the risk that some countries in the region might deny overflight or access to airports or seaports during an armed conflict. In a region where natural disasters are increasing in frequency and severity due to global climate change, a ready stockpile of food, water, fuel, and medical supplies assures an ally or partner that the U.S. military shares its humanitarian and disaster relief concerns and is not solely focused on armed conflict.

Even more critical to integrated assurance is the exercising of sustainment functions during joint and multinational training events. I Corps logisticians working alongside local stevedores, fuelers, vessel crews, trucking companies, seaport managers, and air traffic controllers—both military and civilian—develop familiar relationships while improving their ability to work together through challenges. I Corps’ senior logistics officer, Colonel Daniel Duncan, put it best when he described “Corps and Division level units [as] the military ambassadors of these efforts.”[4] The consistent, increasingly familiar presence of U.S. Army logisticians at seaports and airports throughout the Indo-Pacific demonstrates that the United States is serious about cooperation with and support to the host nation. Multinational exercises such as Talisman Sabre in Australia and Balikatan in the Philippines see multinational forces employ Joint Logistics Over the Shore, which uses expeditionary sustainment equipment and systems to move supplies ashore without relying on an established seaport. I Corps’ willingness to show up consistently, repeatedly train difficult tasks, and invest in shared interoperability reassure allies and partners of the depth of the United States’ commitment.

Conclusion

While Kennan’s 1946 telegram set a foundation for U.S. policies of containment and deterrence during the Cold War, it closes with a signpost to 21st-century U.S. policymakers grappling with the challenges of an aggressive China. The notion that “we must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of [the] sort of world we would like to see” stands as foundational guidance as the United States pursues a free and open Indo-Pacific. The PRC’s aspirations of dominance over the region require acquiescence by its neighbors and the international community. Indo-Pacific countries’ willingness to assert their sovereignty and uphold the rule of law complicates the strategic calculations of an expansionist China more than a simple tally of aircraft carriers and fighter jets. Tangible, visible U.S. support provides the assurance that enables allies and partners to assert their sovereignty.

In many Asian and Pacific societies, relationships and respect carry tremendous weight. As a U.S. ambassador with long experience in the region remarked, “simply showing up goes a long way.”[5] While heads of state, policymakers, and national military leaders frame strategic partnerships, it is the efforts of operational units that cement these relationships with boots on the ground. By posturing trained and ready forces in the region, working alongside allies and partners to protect key locations, and developing forward-postured sustainment assets and capabilities, the U.S. military’s operational units assure like-minded countries that the United States is meaningfully invested in a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Austin Commons is a U.S. Army officer with extensive security cooperation experience in the Indo-Pacific region. Lt. Col. Commons has planned and led security cooperation activities in Mongolia, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea. He has published articles on defense and security cooperation in Military Review and Small Wars Journal and currently serves as a strategic adviser to the commanding general of I Corps.

Xavier Brunson has been confirmed as the next Commanding General of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. Previously, Gen. Brunson commanded I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord. He entered active duty in 1990 and has commanded at multiple levels in both conventional and special operations forces in combat. He has published articles on defense and security in War on the Rocks, the Diplomat, and Army Magazine.

Endnotes

[1] The text of the telegram is available from the National Security Archive at George Washington University at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.

[2] Hannah Beech, “Xi Jinping’s Power of One,” Time, November 6, 2014, https://time.com/3560466/xi-jinpings-power-of-one.

[3] See, for example, “China’s Perspective of Indo-Pacific Security,” Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Security Nexus, webinar, December 4, 2023, https://dkiapcss.edu/security-nexus-webinar-episode-4-chinas-indo-pacific-security.

[4] Daniel Duncan and Derek Hoffman, “Supporting Indo-Pacific Sustainment: Regional Stability Requires Close Cooperation With Allies, Partners,” Association of the United States Army, August 24, 2023, https://www.ausa.org/articles/supporting-indo-pacific-sustainment-regional-stability-requires-close-cooperation-allies.

[5] Authors’ interview with Ambassador Sung Kim, U.S. Embassy Jakarta, August 29, 2023.