Voices Series: Perspectives from the Indo-Pacific on the Next U.S. Administration

Japan

U.S. engagement with Japan and Northeast Asia more broadly has been strong, and Japan hopes this trend will continue under the next U.S. administration to maintain the subregional balance of power. The Biden administration has significantly developed its relationships with U.S. allies and partners through bilateral, trilateral, minilateral, and multilateral means, including the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Japan is deeply committed to most of these initiatives and interested in being a collaborator for Pillar II of AUKUS. U.S.-Japan policy coordination has also been steadily enhanced, as demonstrated by the Japan-U.S. 2+2 meeting in July 2024 on alliance command and coordination.

The Indo-Pacific strategic landscape is rapidly evolving, with China’s continued assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, tensions over the Taiwan Strait, and the development of Russia-China and Russia–North Korea relations. In this context, U.S. military and economic engagements are crucial not only for stabilizing the regional balance of power but also for communicating, coordinating, and fine-tuning cooperation with regional allies and partners for the future.

At the same time, what is missing from the United States is a strategic vision for the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in its approach toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is understandable that the United States tends to focus on result-oriented institutions that produce tangible outcomes, such as enhancing bilateral military coordination with its allies for deterrent purposes. Because ASEAN is a “process-oriented” institution that facilitates dialogue more than concrete results, President Joe Biden skipped ASEAN-related summits in 2023 and 2024. Nonetheless, both Japan and the United States emphasize the importance of ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific and respect ASEAN’s role.

Without a strategic vision for institutional arrangements, the gap between U.S. rhetoric and actions is easily criticized, generating skepticism about new U.S.-centered initiatives. If the United States is determined to significantly shape a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific with its partners, including Japan, its engagement with Southeast Asia will be essential. To that end, the United States needs to articulate its vision for a cooperative and coordinated relationship between “result-oriented” and “process-oriented” institutions in the Indo-Pacific.

Kei Koga is Head of Division and Associate Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs in the School of Social Sciences at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

South Korea

South Korean leaders and the public, across the political spectrum, generally view the United States as their most important partner in addressing issues related to North Korea. From this perspective, Seoul will undoubtedly expect the next U.S. administration to continue strengthening bilateral relations in a way that promotes stability.

However, views on the ideal form of U.S. engagement vary between conservatives and progressives in Seoul. The current conservative president, Yoon Suk Yeol, would likely advocate for maintaining the momentum of trilateral cooperation between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. His policy priorities of strengthening deterrence against North Korea and enhancing South Korea’s global standing align with various trilateral initiatives. Yet, given that the success of the Camp David trilateral summit in August 2023 depended on the Yoon administration’s efforts to improve relations with Japan, his successor, if elected from the progressive camp, might not share the same enthusiasm for measures to expand security cooperation with Tokyo.

Despite their political differences, conservatives and progressives largely agree that South Korea has a vested interest in maintaining the U.S.-led liberal international order. President Yoon’s administration would welcome U.S. support in empowering Seoul politically as it navigates its strategic priorities with Beijing. However, South Korean leaders, including those in the business community, remain wary of being forced to choose sides in the U.S.-China rivalry for global influence. Across the political spectrum, South Korea hopes that its pursuit of foreign policy autonomy will not be misconstrued in Washington as an endorsement of Beijing’s agenda over that of the United States.

With respect to North Korea, South Korea’s expectations for the next U.S. administration could shift if a progressive leader is elected president in 2027. President Yoon will likely continue to seek U.S. backing to bolster deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. In contrast, if a progressive administration comes to power, it could hope to revitalize diplomatic efforts from the Moon Jae-in era, including a possible U.S.–North Korea summit, to advance its agenda of inter-Korean reconciliation.

Ji-Young Lee is an Associate Professor of International Relations at American University.

Australia

For allies on the other side of the world like Australia, the outcome of any U.S. election is consequential. The 2024 election, however, is especially so because of the vastly diverging world views, approaches, and temperaments of the two presidential candidates.

Over the last ten or so years, Australia has made the decision to double-down on its commitment to the U.S.-Australia alliance on the basis that the United States is indispensable to a favorable balance of power in the region and for deterring the use of force by China to advance its territorial ambitions. From Australia’s perspective, the benefits of any economic or military disruption to the regional order resulting from a change in U.S. policy must outweigh the risks of escalation and take care to minimize any collateral damage that might be inflicted on allies. The AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States is a prime example of a disruptive technological partnership where the benefits outweigh the risks.

Conversely, a U.S. administration focused on managed escalation is less overtly risky. Yet, for regional U.S. allies like Australia this approach cannot result in de-escalation in the face of every Chinese provocation in the gray zone, which would allow China to steadily improve its position effectively unopposed. Regardless of who is in the White House, Canberra hopes that the next administration accepts that hard power is essential for creating a favorable balance of power and shaping the strategic environment and commits to increasing defense spending accordingly.

Lavina Lee is a Senior Lecturer at Macquarie University.

Taiwan

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan has increasingly refocused on the risk of a Chinese invasion and has moved swiftly to bolster its military capacity as a means of deterrence. Taiwan has also realigned the country’s economic strategy based on evolving geopolitical realities. However, China has also ramped up comprehensive efforts to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty. These maneuvers include the use of gray-zone tactics as well as the manipulation of global norms and public opinion, both against Taiwan and on the international stage.

In this context, Taiwan would like to see an incoming U.S. administration firmly push back against such efforts and safeguard the continuity of the U.S.-led global governance. However, while deterrence can be achieved through measures such as tariffs, arms sales, and strong rhetoric, Taiwan also needs tools to build resilience in the face of China’s pressure. Taiwan would benefit from a U.S. administration that emphasizes bringing more like-minded countries together to strengthen regional partnerships and alliances. True resilience requires initiatives, international frameworks, and space for global partners to engage and collaborate, ensuring more stability against China’s unification efforts.

Additionally, Taiwan plays a critical role in the United States’s efforts in advancing its technological leadership. Taiwan holds key know-how in manufacturing and innovation that fuels American progress and would be best served by an incoming U.S. presidential administration that recognizes and further strengthens this partnership. Rather than see Taiwan’s interdependence with the United States through a protectionist, zero-sum lens, Taiwan would like to see the new administration welcome Taiwanese investment and the further integration of Taiwan into the U.S. and global supply chains.

Taiwan firmly believes that its relationship with the United States is built on shared security, economic interests, and democratic values. As Taiwan strengthens its resilience, it looks to the next U.S. administration for continued support.

Jasmine Lee is an Editor at US Taiwan Watch, a Taiwan-based think tank focused on expanding domestic understanding of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.

India

India is focused on three primary geopolitical interests. First, it will work to maintain an external environment that channels resources and technology into domestic economic growth and development. India’s challenges are primarily domestic, in terms of ensuring prosperity and human security for its large population.

Second, India must manage significant geopolitical rivalries in its own neighborhood, namely with Pakistan and China. India continues to have major territorial disputes with both countries, including a military standoff with China since mid-2020 that is only now showing signs of what is likely to be a protracted resolution. In addition, it must deal with asymmetric threats from Pakistan and cope with China’s substantial presence as a strategic partner to India’s neighbors, many of whom have historically resented India’s regional dominance.

Third, and finally, Indian leaders have always envisaged a seat for their country at the global high table alongside the great powers of the international order. This is a matter of recognition of India’s great-power potential and contributions to global governance, past and present. India seeks this recognition in the form of “reformed multilateralism” or inclusion as a permanent veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council as well as a top player in various regional and global institutions, ranging from the G-20 to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

The cornerstone of Indian foreign policy, which enables the pursuit of these geopolitical goals or interests, is strategic autonomy. For India, this means not just freedom from external constraints but the freedom to pursue its own path to great-power status. This path will lead in directions that frequently undermine U.S. interests. Thus, India’s ideal relationship with the next U.S. administration will be one where Washington remains one of its most committed strategic partners without making any unreasonable demands on India’s strategic autonomy. This is a viable proposition for both sides, so long as their fundamental interests overlap. In moments when they do not overlap, India will go its own way.

Rohan Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics.

Vietnam

Regardless of who will become the 47th president of the United States, Vietnam’s top interest is that the new administration steer clear of a rapid and intense escalation of great-power competition with China. Such a development could generate second-order adverse effects on Vietnam by forcing it to choose between two superpowers. Like other Southeast Asian states, Vietnam wants to maintain its strategic autonomy and does not want to be forced to take sides. Even as Hanoi has maneuvered and benefited from the U.S.-China rivalry, particularly Washington’s and Beijing’s heightened attention and engagement, it is also cautiously watching for any signs of competition spilling out of control, whether in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait or through the increasing bifurcation of economic and technological domains.

On the economic front, Vietnam hopes the United States will maintain and even strengthen its regional economic presence. Despite growing protectionist sentiment at home, it may be beneficial for Washington to avoid focusing on Vietnam’s trade surplus with the United States, including raising concerns about currency manipulation or pressure to decouple from China regarding certain strategic products like undersea cables. Continued funding for technology cooperation, particularly collaborative initiatives to develop Vietnam’s semiconductor ecosystem and measure its reserve of rare earth elements, is also critical. These projects support Vietnam’s goal of becoming a major semiconductor manufacturer and assist the United States in diversifying and securing the supply chains of strategic products and technologies.

Additionally, the new administration could extend support for Vietnam’s efforts at building regional institutions. Vietnam recently organized the ASEAN Future Forum to revitalize discussions on the trajectory of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and find solutions to its internal and external challenges. The United States could send a delegate to the next forum meeting to demonstrate its engagement and offer its perspectives. Doing so would show Washington’s willingness to engage consistently and constructively with Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

Hanh Nguyen is a PhD Scholar in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University and a Research Fellow at the Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies.

Indonesia

The Prabowo Subianto administration seeks broader engagement with both Indonesia and the region as a whole from the next U.S. president. The United States has started to pay more attention to the region in the last few years, including by conducting more military exercises with Indonesia. However, such attention in the security domain has not been followed by more economic, political, and cultural engagements with the region, making it difficult to compete with China’s growing soft power.

Even though the United States may point out that there have been more visits by high-ranking U.S. officials to the region, especially Indonesia, the number of visits still pales in comparison with China’s economic and social engagement. Indonesia is actively looking for more investment from the United States in its industries and infrastructure, as well as a stronger trade relationship with the United States to reduce its reliance on Chinese investment and trade. Moreover, in the past few years, China has been projecting its soft power through educational and social exchanges, such as by offering more scholarships to Indonesian students and promoting Chinese-language education. In contrast, the United States seems to rest on its laurels. The good news is that the United States remains one of the preferred destinations for Indonesians to study abroad, thus offering opportunities for greater cultural exchange.

In sum, even though Indonesia welcomes more defense cooperation with the United States and values the U.S. security umbrella, it does not want more saber-rattling—or anything that might increase tension in the region. What Indonesia is looking for from the next administration is more trade and investment as well as social, cultural, and educational engagement to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region.

Yohanes Sulaiman is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani in Indonesia.